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INTRODUCTION

Bankruptcy law illuminates the tensions in our federal system
between state and federal law better than any other body of law.
Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code' pursuant to its power under
the Constitution to enact laws "on the subject of Bankruptcies."2 The
Code, a federal statute, creates a procedure for adjusting the
relationship between a debtor in financial distress and its creditors,
through either liquidation of its property for distribution to creditors
or reorganization of its business affairs. The Code, however, does not
create this debtor-creditor relationship.
Nonbankruptcy lawpredominantly state law-creates this relationship.
The Code explicitly and implicitly recognizes its dependence on
state law in altering the relationship between the debtor and its
creditors.' Many provisions of the Code incorporate state law. On
the other hand, many other provisions of the Code overrule state law.
Unfortunately, neither courts nor scholars have developed a coherent
theory for deciding when Congress must follow state law and when it
may overrule state law.
This article provides an analytical framework for determining when
Congress may decline to follow state law and when it must follow
state law. This framework requires that Congress and courts identify
and respect the limits of Congress's power to enact bankruptcy law
under the Constitution. In my view, Congress may use its power to
enact bankruptcy law only to adjust the relationship between an
insolvent debtor and his, her, or its creditors. Therefore, Congress
may use its bankruptcy power to overrule state law only to the extent
that it is adjusting this relationship. Congress may not do more.
Understanding Congress's limits on modifying state law in
bankruptcy is important for several reasons.' The Supreme Court and
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (2000), enacted by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
2. The United States Constitution empowers Congress to "establish ...uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S. Const. art.
I, § 8, cl.
4.
3. See infra Part I.
4. Recognizing the limits on Congress's power under the Bankruptcy Code to
alter state law will also enable federal courts in bankruptcy to produce analytically
sounder and more predictable judicial decisions in applying the Code when the Code
does not provide a clear answer. In my view, federal courts in bankruptcy are bound
by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). At its very core, Erie is a
particular expression of the limitation on federal power inherent in the Constitution:
Federal courts may not create federal common law in matters beyond the scope of
Congress's enumerated powers. This core principle of Erie requires that, in a
bankruptcy case, federal courts must find and follow the state law when resolving
state law issues that are beyond the scope of the Bankruptcy Clause. For example,
under my view of the limits of the Bankruptcy Power, Congress and federal courts
must defer to state law on the question of what constitutes an interest in property of
the debtor that may be liquidated for distribution to creditors. Thus, when there is no
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other federal courts have begun to take more seriously the limitations
on congressional power under the Commerce Clause 5 and other parts
of the Constitution.6 Bankruptcy law plays an important role in the
economic life of the country, both in planning transactions and in
litigating disputes.7 Accordingly, maintaining the integrity of our
federal constitutional structure-federalism in the broadest sense'requires that both Congress and the federal courts recognize and
respect the limitations on Congress's power to enact bankruptcy laws.
Moreover, as Congress continues to tinker with the Code9 and
direct state law authority on a particular issue, federal courts cannot simply fall back
onto "federal policy" and create, in effect, federal common law. They must strive to
resolve the issues by analyzing all of the potential elements under the richer and
broader body of state law. I address how the Erie doctrine applies in bankruptcy and
all of the complications that such application presents in a forthcoming article. See
Thomas E. Plank, The Erie Doctrine and Bankruptcy (forthcoming 2003) (draft
manuscript on file with the Fordham Law Review).
5. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-19 (2000) (holding that the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution did not permit Congress to enact the civil
remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (holding that the Commerce Clause does not authorize
Congress to ban weapons from schools).
6. Recently, the Court has invalidated the application of federal statutes to the
states on grounds that they violate the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Fed. Mar.
Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Authority, 122 S. Ct. 1864 (2002) (holding that state
sovereign immunity precluded the Federal Maritime Commission from adjudicating a
private party's complaint that a state-run port had violated the Shipping Act); Alden
v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that Congress could not subject state to suit by
state probation officers for violation of overtime provisions of Fair Labor Standards
Act in state court without state's consent); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (holding that neither the Commerce
Clause nor the Patent Clause authorized Congress to abrogate state sovereign
immunity under the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act);
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress lacked
authority under the Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity and compelling negotiations under the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act).
7. See, e.g., Nat'l Bankr. Rev. Comm'n, Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty Years §
3.1, at 722 & n.1739 (1997) [hereinafter NBRC Rep.].
8. This article does not address the extent to which Congress may empower
actions against state governments in federal courts in bankruptcy. Commentators
classify the issue of a State's immunity from suit in federal court as an issue of
"federalism." See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the
Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 429,431 (2002). I consider
this issue to be a narrower one, a subset of the larger question of federalism,
concerning the relationship between the federal government and state governments
under the U.S. Constitution.
9. Since the Code's enactment in 1978, Congress has amended it numerous times.
Congress has been actively debating significant bankruptcy amendments since 1997
and finally passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000, see H.R. 2415, 106th Cong. § 1
(2000) (providing for enactment into law of the provisions of S. 3186 of the 106th
Congress, as introduced on October 11, 2000 by the conference committee for the
House and Senate bills, which was passed December 7, 2000). The text of S. 3186 is
included in the H.R. 2415 conference report: H.R. Rep. No. 106-970 (2000). President
Clinton pocket vetoed the bill on December 19, 2000. The bill that passed in 2000 was
reintroduced in Congress in 2001, but the House and Senate passed somewhat
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scholars debate the merits of bankruptcy,"' Congress needs a clearer
idea of the constraints of a constitutionally permissible bankruptcy
law, especially as it responds to focused and effective special interest
groups seeking to shape the Code."

As a prelude to analyzing when Congress must respect state law
entitlements, Part I briefly describes the significant extent to which
the Code defers to and depends on state law. In essence, the Code

embraces federalism. However, the Code's reliance on state law,
which is the dominant source for nonbankruptcy law, masks an
important question: To what extent may Congress override state law
and to what extent must Congress respect state law? The answer to
this question depends in turn on understanding the limits of
Congress's power to enact bankruptcy law under the Constitution.
Part II begins the process of identifying Congress's power to enact
laws "on the subject of Bankruptcies" by analyzing the understanding
of "bankruptcies" at the time of the enactment of the United States
Constitution as reflected both in the term "bankruptcy"' 2 and in the
then extant varieties of bankruptcy laws. From this understanding
and core elements of these bankruptcy laws, I conclude that the

"subject of Bankruptcies"

is limited to the adjustment of the

relationship between an insolvent debtor and his, her, or its creditors.

In Part III, I describe four principles that amplify the meaning of
the "subject of Bankruptcies." Three of these principles directly
govern the relationship between the federal government under the
Bankruptcy Power and the states, and the extent to which Congress
different versions of the bills. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 220, 107th
Cong. (placed on the calendar in the Senate January 31, 2001); Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 333, 107th Cong. (passed by
the House March 31, 2001). The House and the Senate were not able to reconcile
differences between the two versions, and these bills expired when the 107th Congress
adjourned.
10. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 Yale L.J.
573, 576-80 (1998) (dividing bankruptcy scholars into two large groups, designated
"traditionalists" and "proceduralists"); Linda Rusch, Bankruptcy Reorganization
Jurisprudence: Matters of Belief, Faith, and Hope-Stepping into the Fourth
Dimension, 55 Mont. L. Rev. 9 (1994) (analyzing two views of the purpose of
bankruptcy reorganization, maximizing creditor wealth and loss allocation among
various constituencies, and the values underlying each view).
11. See generally David A. Skeel, Jr., Debt's Dominion: A History of Bankruptcy
Law in America (2001) (describing how the self interest of debtors, creditors, and
bankruptcy professionals have shaped bankruptcy law in America); Thomas E. Plank,
Bankruptcy Professionals, Debtor Dominance and the Future of Bankruptcy: A
Review and a Rhapsody on a Theme, 18 Bankr. Dev. J. 337 (2002) (reviewing David
A. Skeel, Jr., Debt's Dominion: A History of Bankruptcy Law in America (2001), and
describing the recent battles between pro-debtor interests and secured creditors over
Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code as well as the attack by prodebtor interests on securitization and the efforts of the securitization industry to
broaden securitization).
12. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalismfor NonOriginalists,45 Loy. L.
Rev. 611, 620-21, 633 (1999).
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may overrule state law. These three principles are the DebtorCreditor Adjustment Principle, the Non-Expropriation Principle, and
the Non-Interference Principle. The fourth principle, the DebtorInsolvency Principle, does not directly govern the extent to which
Congress may overrule state law, but it does limit Congress's ability to
alter the state law rights of creditors and debtors to those debtors who
are insolvent in some sense. 3
Under the Debtor-Creditor Adjustment Principle, Congress may
adjust
the debtor-creditor
relationship by curtailing the
nonbankruptcy rights of a debtor for the benefit of the debtor's
creditors and by curtailing the nonbankruptcy rights of creditors
against the debtor for the benefit of the debtor or other creditors.
Under the Non-Expropriation Principle, however, Congress may
not expand the rights of debtors or their creditors beyond those
necessary to adjust their relationship or otherwise diminish either (i)
the rights or prerogatives of parties outside of the debtor-creditor
relationship ("Third Parties") for the benefit of the debtor or the
creditors or (ii) the nonbankruptcy rights of the debtor or the
creditors for the benefit of these Third Parties. For example,
bankruptcy law may not expropriate the home of the debtor's
neighbor to help pay the debtor's creditors; give claims in bankruptcy
to Third Parties like workers, governments, or businesses that they do
not have outside of bankruptcy; or grant a debtor a divorce from the
debtor's spouse, no matter how much such actions would facilitate
liquidation or reorganization
of the debtor or help an individual
t4
debtor obtain a fresh start.
The Non-Interference Principle constrains the Non-Expropriation
Principle. It provides that Congress may prevent a Third Party from
using nonbankruptcy law to frustrate the bankruptcy process or from
using the bankruptcy of a debtor to obtain a benefit that the Third
Party could not obtain under nonbankruptcy law.
Part IV describes the interaction of these principles in the Code.
Congress has not exercised the full extent of its powers under the
Debtor-Creditor Adjustment Principle to alter the rights of creditors.
Specifically, under the Bankruptcy Clause, Congress could abolish
security interests in bankruptcy.15 Congress has not done so,
although
16
it has reduced the rights of secured creditors in bankruptcy.
Consistent with the Non-Expropriation Principle, the Code for the
most part respects the property interests of Third Parties. In addition,
13. See infra note 115 and accompanying text (describing both cash flow
insolvency and balance sheet insolvency).
14. See infra Part III.B.
15. I do think, however, that the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution prohibits Congress from completely abolishing security interests in
bankruptcy. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
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consistent with the Non-Interference Principle, the Code generally
prevents a Third Party from using the debtor's commencement of a
bankruptcy case to obtain a benefit that the Third Party could not
obtain outside of bankruptcy, such as termination of a contract with
the debtor solely because of a bankruptcy filing.
The Code, however,
17
does violate these principles in a few instances.
Others may not agree with my conception of the limitations that the
Bankruptcy Clause places on Congress. Nevertheless, unless one
takes the position that the Bankruptcy Clause serves as a general
welfare provision empowering Congress to take any action it deems
appropriate, one must conceive of some demarcation of the limits on
Congress's power to alter nonbankruptcy entitlements. Of course, the
extent to which Congress should alter or respect nonbankruptcy
entitlements of debtors, creditors, and Third Parties depends on both
the constitutional and the normative limits of bankruptcy law. There is
no consensus on the normative limits of bankruptcy law,' and that
topic is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, whatever view
one has of the purpose of bankruptcy law, any view must fit within,
and may not exceed, some concept of a limited Bankruptcy Power.
I. THE FEDERALISM INHERENT IN THE CODE
The Bankruptcy Code establishes a comprehensive procedure for
adjusting the relationship between an insolvent debtor and its
creditors. The Code provides for: (1) the commencement of a case by
the filing of a petition by the debtor or its creditors; 9 (2) the filing of
proofs of claims of the creditors;2 ' (3) the allowance of creditors'
claims;2' (4) the gathering, liquidation, and distribution of the debtor's
property to satisfy creditor claims;2 2 (5) as an alternative to
liquidation, the preparation, dissemination, and approval of a plan of

17. See infra Part IV.
18. See, e.g., Baird, supra note 10 (summarizing two prominent views of the
purposes of bankruptcy law).
19. See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (2000) (voluntary petition by debtor); id. § 302 (voluntary
joint petition by individual debtor and spouse); id. § 303 (involuntary petition by
creditors).
20. See id. § 501 (specifying who may file proofs of claims).
21. See id. § 502 (specifying how claims may be allowed, disallowing certain claims
and allowing estimates of certain contingent claims or unliquidated claims).
22. See id. § 704(1) (specifying the duty of a trustee in a Chapter 7 liquidation to
gather and reduce to money the property of the estate); id. § 726 (requiring
distribution of property of the estate). From the beginning, federal bankruptcy law
has provided for liquidation of the debtor's property to satisfy creditor claims. See
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978) (repealed 1978)); Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch.
176, § 14, 14 Stat. 517, 22-24 (repealed 1878); Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 3, 5 Stat.
440, 442-43 (repealed 1843); Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, § 5, 2 Stat. 19, 23 (repealed
1803). The 1800 Act was based on the English Bankrupt Acts in effect at that time.
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reorganization that provides for payment of creditor claims; 23 and (6)
the discharge of the debts of an individual debtor in a liquidation and
the discharge of the debts of any debtor under a confirmed
reorganization plan.24
The Code also contains many other provisions that support the
bankruptcy process.
It imposes an automatic stay of creditor
collection actions during the case.25 It authorizes the trustee to use,
sell, or lease property of the estate; 26 to assume or reject executory
contracts and unexpired leases;27 to operate the debtor's business;2"
23. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121-1129(2000) (specifying, in a Chapter 11 case, the filing
of a plan of reorganization, the contents of the plan. and the procedure for acceptance
of the plan by creditors and confirmation of the plan by the court); id. §§ 1221-1225
(specifying the same in a Chapter 12 case for farmers); id. §§ 1321-1325 (specifying
the same in a Chapter 13 case for individuals with regular income). Congress first
provided a comprehensive scheme for reorganizing debtors in 1933. See Bankruptcy
Act, §§ 73-77 (added by Act of Mar. 3, 1933, ch. 204, 47, Stat. 1467) (adding three new
reorganization sections: section 74 for persons other than corporations; section 75 for
farmers; and section 77 for railroads). The following year, Congress added new
section 77B to provide for the reorganization of corporations. See Bankruptcy Act, §
77B (added by Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, § 1, 48 Stat. 911 (codified as amended at
11 U.S.C. § 207 (1934) (repealed 1938))). Finally, pursuant to the 1938 Chandler Act,
Congress replaced the more general reorganization sections, sections 74 and 77B, with
four new chapters-chapter X for the reorganization of large corporations; chapter
XI for the adjustment of the unsecured debt of smaller businesses; chapter XII for the
adjustment of real estate debt of individuals and partnerships; and chapter XIII for
the adjustment of debts of wage earners. See Bankruptcy Act, §§ 101-276 [ch. X], 301399 [ch. XI], 401-526 [ch. XII], 601-686 [ch. XIII] (as added by Act of June 22, 1938,
ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 840, 883-938 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 [ch. X],
701-799 [ch. XI], 801-926 [ch. XII], 1001-1086 [ch. XIII] (1976) (repealed 1978))).
Section 75, for farmers, initially applied only to petitions filed within five years. Id. §
75(c), 47 Stat. at 1471. This deadline was eventually extended to March 1, 1949.
Section 77, codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1976) (repealed 1978), remained
in effect until the adoption of the Bankruptcy Code.
Before 1933, bankruptcy law did allow arrangement of the debtor's affairs in
lieu of liquidation, with the consent of a supermajority of the debtor's creditors. See
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 12, 30 Stat. 544, 549-50 (1898) (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. § 30 (1926) (repealed 1933)); Act-of June 22, 1874, ch. 390, § 17,
18 Stat. 178, 182-83 (repealed 1878) (adding to the short-lived bankruptcy law of 1867
provisions allowing debtors to enter into composition agreements and extension
agreements binding on all unsecured creditors if a majority in number and 75% in
value agreed, upheld in In re Reiman, 20 F. Cas. 490, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1874) (No.
11,673), aff'd, 20 F. Cas. 500, 501 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875) (No. 11,675). See also infra
note 102 and accompanying text (discussing eighteenth-century legislation imposing
on minority creditors an arrangement between an insolvent debtor and a majority of
his or her creditors).
24. See 11 U.S.C. § 727 (2000) (providing when an individual may receive a
discharge of debts in Chapter 7); id. § 1141(d) (providing that the effect of a
confirmed Chapter 11 plan is to discharge the debts of the debtor); id. § 1228
(authorizing a discharge of debts of a debtor in a Chapter 12 case upon completion of
all payments required by a confirmed plan); id. § 1328 (same for debtor in a Chapter
13 case).
25. See id. § 362(a) (providing that the filing of a petition operates as a stay of
numerous acts against the debtor, property of the estate, or property of the debtor).
26. See id. § 363.
27. See id. § 365.
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and to recover preferential, fraudulent, unperfected, and other
inappropriate transfers.29
As comprehensive as the Bankruptcy Code is, however, it is still a
thin veneer built on a much deeper body of nonbankruptcy law, most
of which is state law. 3' Many Code provisions explicitly defer to:
(i) a specific type of "law,"'"
(ii) applicable law,32
28. See id. § 721 (providing that the bankruptcy court may authorize the trustee to
operate a debtor's business for a limited time if such operation is in the best interests
of the estate and consistent with the orderly liquidation of the estate); id. §§ 1107,
1108 (allowing the trustee, including the debtor in possession, to operate the debtor's
business unless the court orders otherwise); id. §§ 1202(b)(5), 1203 (providing that
debtor in a Chapter 12 case, or a trustee if the debtor ceases to be a debtor in
possession, may operate the debtor's farm); id. § 1304 (allowing an individual engaged
in business to continue to operate the business); see also id. § 364 (authorizing the
trustee to borrow money).
29. See id. § 547(b) (avoidance of preferential transfers); id. § 548 (avoidance of
fraudulent transfers); id. § 544(a) (avoidance of unperfected transfers); id. § 546
(avoidance of certain statutory liens); id. § 549 (avoidance of postpetition transfers).
30. The Code also specifically defers to federal law. See id. § 362(b)(8) (excepting
from the automatic stay an action by the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development to foreclose a mortgage insured under the National Housing Act); id. §
362(b)(12) (excepting from the automatic stay an action involving a Chapter 11
debtor brought by the Secretary of Transportation "to foreclose a preferred ship or
fleet mortgage, or a security interest in or relating to a vessel or vessel under
construction, held by the Secretary of Transportation"); id. § 362(b)(13) (excepting
from the automatic stay an action by the Secretary of Commerce to foreclose a
preferred ship or fleet mortgage in a vessel or a mortgage, deed of trust, or other
security interest in a fishing facility held by the Secretary of Commerce); id. §
362(b)(16) (excepting from the automatic stay "any action by a guaranty agency...
[under] the Higher Education Act of 1965 or the Secretary of Education regarding the
eligibility of the debtor to participate in programs authorized under such Act"); id. §
364(f) (providing that, except for certain underwriters, section 5 of the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 does not apply to the offer or sale under
section 364 of a security that is not an equity security); id. § 522(b)(2) (providing that
a debtor may exempt from the claims of creditors in a bankruptcy case property
exempt under nonbankruptcy federal law); id. § 541(b)(3) (excluding from property
of the estate any eligibility of the debtor to participate in programs authorized under
the Higher Education Act of 1965); id. § 1145 (exempting the issuance of certain
securities pursuant to a reorganization plan from the registration requirements of the
Securities Act of 1933); id. § 1166 (subjecting railroad reorganizations to certain
provisions of federal law, including subtitle IV of title 49 and section 601(b) of the
Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973).
31. See, e.g., id. § 101 (9)(A)(ii) (defining a "corporation" to include a "partnership
association organized under a law that makes only the capital subscribed responsible
for the debts of such association"); id. § 110(k) (providing that nothing in this section
dealing with negligent or fraudulent bankruptcy petitions "shall be construed to
permit activities that are otherwise prohibited by law, including rules and laws that
prohibit the unauthorized practice of law").
32. See id. § 101(1) (defining "accountant" as an "accountant authorized under
applicable law to practice public accounting"); id. § 101(4) (defining an "attorney" as
an "attorney, professional law association, corporation, or partnership, authorized
under applicable law to practice law"); id. § 101(11) (defining a "custodian" with
reference to "applicable" law); id. § 365(c)(1)(A) (prohibiting the trustee from
assuming or assigning any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor if
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(iii) nonbankruptcy law,33
"applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such contract or lease from
accepting performance from or rendering performance to an entity other than the
debtor"); id. § 502(b)(1) (disallowing claims to the extent that the claims are
"unenforceable against the debtor and property of the debtor, under any agreement
or applicable law for a reason other than because such claim is contingent or
unmatured"); id. § 505(c) (providing that notwithstanding the automatic stay, a
governmental unit charged with responsibility for collection of tax determination by
the court under section 505 may assess such tax subject to any otherwise applicable
law); id. § 507(a)(8) (providing an eighth priority for certain taxes owed to
governmental units under applicable law); id. § 543(c) (protecting a custodian against
a surcharge for a disbursement made in accordance with applicable law); id. § 544(b)
(giving to the trustee the right to avoid transfers of property or obligations incurred
that creditors could avoid under "applicable law"); id. § 546(b)(1) (providing that a
trustee's avoidance powers are subject to "generally applicable law" permitting
certain actions to perfect or continue or maintain perfection); id. §§ 547(e)(1),
548(d)(1), 549(c) (defining when certain transfers of property are deemed made or
are protected by reference to perfection under applicable law); id. § 723 (providing
that the trustee of a partnership debtor whose estate is insufficient to pay in full all
allowed claims has a claim against any general partner to the extent that under
applicable nonbankruptcy law the general partner is personally liable for such claims);
id. § 761 (10)(ix) (defining "customer property" to include "property of the debtor
that any applicable law, rule, or regulation requires to be set aside or held for the
benefit of a customer").
33. See, e.g., id. § 101(35A) (defining "intellectual property" as "(A) trade secret;
(B) invention, process, design, or plant protected under title 35; (C) patent
application; (D) plant variety; (E) work of authorship protected under title 17; or (F)
mask work protected under chapter 9 of title 17 [in each instance] to the extent
protected by applicable nonbankruptcy law"); id. § 106(a)(4) (providing that
enforcement of a bankruptcy court order against a governmental unit "shall be
consistent with appropriate nonbankruptcy law applicable to such governmental
unit"); id. § 108 (providing for the extension of time periods provided by
nonbankruptcy law for the commencement of an action or the filing of pleadings); id.
§ 363(f)(1) (authorizing the trustee to sell property free and clear of any interest in
such property of an entity other than the estate if "applicable nonbankruptcy law
permits sale of such property free and clear of such interest"); id. § 365(c)(3)
(prohibiting the trustee from assuming a lease of "nonresidential real property [that]
has been terminated under applicable nonbankruptcy law prior to the order for
relief'); id. § 365(h)(1)(A) (allowing a lessee under a lease of real property under
which the debtor is the lessor and which the trustee has rejected to treat the rejection
as a termination to the extent that applicable nonbankruptcy law would allow such
treatment, or to retain its rights under the lease to the extent that such rights are
enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law); id. § 365(h)(2)(A) (giving similar
rights to the purchaser of a time share interest sold by a debtor under a contract
rejected by the trustee); id. § 365(n)(1) (giving similar rights to a licensee of a right to
intellectual property under an executory contract rejected by the trustee under which
the debtor is a licensor); id. § 510(a) (providing that a subordination agreement is
enforceable in a bankruptcy case "to the same extent that such agreement is
enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law"); id. § 552(b)(1) (providing that if a
security interest created by a security agreement extends to property of the debtor
acquired before the commencement of the case and to proceeds of such property,
then the security interest extends to the proceeds acquired by the estate after the
commencement of the case to the extent provided by the security agreement and by
applicable nonbankruptcy law); id. § 723 (providing that the trustee of a partnership
debtor whose estate is insufficient to pay in full all allowed claims has a claim against
any general partner to the extent that under applicable nonbankruptcy law the
general partner is personally liable for such claims); id. § 927 (providing that the
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(iv) state, territorial, or local law,34 and
(v) in a few instances, "common law" and "law merchant."35
Other important sections of the Code do not expressly refer to
nonbankruptcy law.
Nevertheless, they directly incorporate
nonbankruptcy law. Two significant provisions of the Code fall into
this category: (1) the definition of the property of the estate to be
distributed to creditors, and (2) the definition of creditors who may
participate in the estate.
Under section 541(a), the commencement of a bankruptcy case
creates an estate. The principal components of property of the estate
are "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property" as of the
filing.36 The Bankruptcy Code does not define "interests of the debtor
holder of a claim payable solely from special revenues of a municipal debtor under
applicable nonbankruptcy law will be treated as having a non-recourse claim under
the Code); id. §§ 1123(d), 1222(d), 1322(e) (providing that, if a Chapter 11, 12, or 13
plan proposes to cure a default, the amount necessary to cure the default is
determined in accordance with the underlying agreement and applicable
nonbankruptcy law).
34. See id. § 109(c)(2) (providing that a municipality may be a debtor under
Chapter 9 if it is "specifically authorized, in its capacity as a municipality or by name,
to be a debtor under such chapter by State law, or by a governmental officer or
organization empowered by State law to authorize such entity to be a debtor"); id. §
346(b)(1) (authorizing the imposition of certain taxes against a debtor under "a State
or local law"); id. § 364(f) (providing that, except for certain underwriters, "any State
or local law requiring registration for offer or sale of a security or registration or
licensing of an issuer of, underwriter of, or broker or dealer in, a security does not
apply to the offer or sale under ... section [364] of a security that is not an equity
security"); id. § 507(a)(7) (providing a seventh priority to the payment of certain
alimony, maintenance, or support claims owed under a "determination made in
accordance with State or territorial law by a governmental unit"); id. § 522(b)(2)
(providing that a debtor may exempt from the claims of creditors in a bankruptcy case
property exempt under "State or local law"); id. § 523(a)(5), (15), (18) (providing that
a discharge does not discharge certain alimony, maintenance, or support claims owed
under a determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a
governmental unit, or certain claims owed under State law to a State or municipality
that is in the nature of support); id. § 547(c)(7) (providing that on certain alimony,
maintenance, or support claims owed under a "determination made in accordance
with State or territorial law by a governmental unit" may not be avoided as
preferences).
35. See id. § 101(45) (defining "relative" as an "individual related by affinity or
consanguinity within the third degree as determined by the common law, or individual
in a step or adoptive relationship within such third degree"); id. § 546(c), (d)
(providing that the trustee's avoidance powers are subject to certain "statutory or
common-law" rights of reclamation); id. §§ 556, 559-660 (defining the contractual
right of a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, repo participant, or swap
participant to liquidate a commodity contract, a repurchase agreement, or a swap
agreement to include a right "arising under common law [and] under law merchant").
36. See id. § 541.
(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title
creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property,
wherever located and by whomever held:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal
or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of
the case.
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in property." Nonbankruptcy law is the only source for determining
the "interests of the debtor in property." Accordingly, the many
provisions of the Code that explicitly refer to "property of the estate"
also depend fundamentally on nonbankruptcy law.
Other Code sections also require the determination of the
prepetition property interests of the debtor.37 The most prominent
examples are those sections that allow the trustee to avoid
unperfected, preferential, or fraudulent prepetition transfers of an
"interest of the debtor in property '3 or "property of the debtor"39 or
Id. The other enumerated items refer to community property, id. § 541(a)(2), and to
property added to the estate after the commencement of the case, id. § 541(a)(3)-(7).
For the adjustment of debts under Chapter 12 (family farmers) and Chapter 13
(individuals with regular income), property of the estate also includes property of the
kind specified in § 541 acquired by the debtor and earnings from services performed
after the commencement of the case until the case is closed, dismissed, or converted.
See id. §§ 1207, 1306.
37. See id. § 101(2)(D) (defining affiliate); id. § 101(11)(A), (C) (defining
custodian); id. § 101(28) (defining indenture); id. § 102(2) (defining claim against the
debtor to include a claim against property of the debtor); id. § 109(a) (specifying
eligibility requirements for a debtor); id. § 303(b)(1), (h)(2) (governing involuntary
petition); id. § 346(j)(5) (enacting special tax provisions); id. § 362(a)(5) (imposing
stay of acts against property of debtor); id. § 362(b)(3), (17) (excepting certain acts
from the automatic stay); id. § 365(d)(1), (2), (6)(C) (setting forth time limits on
assumption of leases of property of the debtor); id. § 365(d)(3), (10) (requiring the
trustee to perform obligations of the debtor under unexpired leases of real or
personal property); id. § 365(j) (providing lien on interest of the debtor in property
for amounts paid by purchaser under rejected executory contract to purchase
property); id. § 502(b)(1) (requiring disallowance of certain claims against property of
the debtor); id. § 522(b), (d) (authorizing individual debtors to exempt certain
interests in property); id. § 522(f), (h) (authorizing individual debtors to avoid liens on
and transfers of property that may be exempted); id. § 541(a)(2), (5) (including in
property of estate interest of the debtor in community property or certain property
acquired within 180 days after the petition); id. § 541(b)(2), (4), (5) (excluding certain
property of the debtor from property of the estate); id. § 541(c)(1) (invalidating
clauses terminating or conditioning property interests because of bankruptcy); id. §
541(d) (distinguishing legal and equitable interests of the debtor); id. § 543(a), (b)
(requiring the return of debtor's property in possession of a custodian); id. § 552(b)
(security interest in proceeds and rents); id. § 557 (providing for expedited disposition
of interests in grain held by debtor that owns or operates a grain storage facility); id. §
722 (authorizing redemption of consumer property of the debtor); id. § 727(a)(2)(A),
(4)(D) (providing exceptions to discharge); id. § 749(a) (allowing the trustee to avoid
transfers of property in a stockbroker liquidation); id. § 764(a) (allowing the trustee to
avoid transfers of property in a commodity broker liquidation); id. § 902(1) (defining
property of the estate in a municipal reorganization); id. § 904(2) (limiting the court's
powers over the property or revenues of the debtor); id. § 926(b) (limiting avoidance
of payments to bondholders as a preference); id. § 1222(b)(7) (authorizing a plan to
provide for payment of claims from property of the debtor in a farmer
reorganization); id. § 1322(b)(8) (authorizing a plan to provide for payment of claims
from property of the debtor in a wage-earner reorganization).
38. See id. § 544(b) (authorizing the trustee to avoid a transfer of "an interest of
the debtor in property" that would be avoidable by an actual creditor); id. § 547(b)
(authorizing the trustee to avoid preferential transfer of "an interest of the debtor in
property"); id. § 548(a), (b) (authorizing the trustee to avoid fraudulent transfer of an
interest of the debtor in property).
39. See id. § 544(a) (authorizing the trustee to avoid unperfected transfer of
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the fixing of certain statutory liens on "property of the debtor.' ' A
few other sections of the Code require determination of the interests
in property that the estate may have 4' or that other entities may
have.42 Other
sections simply require a determination of what is
"property. '43 Again, the Code depends on nonbankruptcy law for the
determination of these property interests.
property of the debtor).
40. Id. § 545.
41. See id. § 328(c) (permitting courts to deny attorney's compensation or
reimbursement); id. § 362(a)(2), (3), (4) (imposing automatic stay of acts against
property of the estate); id. § 363(a) (defining cash collateral); id. § 363(b)(1), (c)(1)
(authorizing sale or use of property of the estate); id. § 364(c), (d) (authorizing lien on
property of estate to secure borrowing); id. § 502(b)(3) (requiring disallowance of
certain tax claims against property of the estate); id. § 506(a) (defining secured claim);
id. § 541(a)(6), (7) (including in property of the estate proceeds from property of the
estate other than an individual's earnings and property acquired by the estate after
the commencement of the case); id. § 552(a), (b) (invalidating security interests in
property acquired by the estate postpetition other than proceeds of a prepetition
security interest); id. § 724(b) (specifying the distribution of property in which the
estate has an interest and which is subject to a lien of a secured creditor and to a tax
lien).
42. See id. § 361 (providing for adequate protection of interest of entity in
property); id. § 362(d), (f) (providing for relief from stay for a party in interest with an
interest in property subject to the stay); id. § 363(a) (defining cash collateral); id. §
363(c)(2) (restricting the use of cash collateral in which an entity other than the estate
has an interest); id. § 363(e) (conditioning use of property upon providing adequate
protection for entity with interest in property); id. § 363(f), (g), (h), (i) (authorizing
under specified conditions the sale of property in which an entity other than the estate
has an interest); id. § 364(d) (requiring adequate protection to existing secured
creditor if court authorizes a lien of equal or superior priority on property in which
estate has an interest to secure borrowing); id. § 506(a), (b) (defining a secured claim
and allowing secured creditor interest on claim if the value of property securing claim
exceeds amount of claim); id. § 541(a)(2), (7) (including in property of estate interest
of the debtor's spouse in community property and property acquired by the estate);
id. § 557(c) (providing for expedited disposition of interests in grain); id. § 725
(requiring disposition of any property in which an entity other than the estate has an
interest); id. § 741(4) (defining customer property held by a debtor for or on account
of a customer in a stockbroker liquidation); id. § 761(10)(A)(vii), (ix) (defining
customer property held by a debtor for or on account of a customer in a commodity
brokers liquidation); id. § 1110(a)(1) (exempting holders of claims secured by aircraft
equipment or lessors or conditional sellers of aircraft equipment from restrictions of
Code); id. § 1168 (exempting holders of claims secured by railroad rolling stock
equipment or lessors or conditional sellers of railroad rolling stock equipment from
restrictions of Code); id.§ 1205(b) (authorizing adequate protection of interest of an
entity in property in a farmer reorganization); id. § 1206 (authorizing the sale of
farmland or farm equipment that is property of the estate free and clear of any
interest in such property of an entity other than the estate).
43. See, e.g., id. § 101(21A) (defining farmout agreement); id. § 101(25), (26)
(defining forward contract and forward contract merchant); id. § 101(32)(A), (B)
(defining insolvent); id. § 101(35A) (defining intellectual property); id. § 101(38)
(defining margin payment); id. § 101(53) (defining statutory lien and distinguishing
judicial lien and security interest); id. § 101(53D) (defining time share plan and time
share interest); id. § 101(56A) (defining term overriding royalty as an "interest in
liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons"); id. § 346(b)(1), (g)(1)(A) (special tax provisions);
id. § 362(b)(2)(B) (excepting from the automatic stay "the collection of alimony,

2002]

BANKRUPTCY AND FEDERALISM

1075

Similarly, section 101(10) defines a creditor as an entity that has a

"claim" that "arose" before the filing of a bankruptcy petition."

A

"claim" is a "right to payment. 4 5 The Code defines neither "right to
payment" nor "arose." Thus, the Code depends on nonbankruptcy
law for the determination of who is a creditor eligible to receive a
share of the debtor's prepetition property. Finally, other essential
4 6 "transfer
concepts, such as "corporation,"
' 49

"security

interest,

"lease," 50

and

47

of property, "lien,"48

"contract,"51

depend

on

nonbankruptcy law.
Because the bulk of nonbankruptcy law is state law, the Code

expressly and impliedly depends on state law. Thus, the Code
specifically embraces the federalism of our system of government. As

maintenance, or support from property that is not property of the estate"); id. §
362(b)(6), (7) (excepting from automatic stay certain setoffs); id. § 362(b)(13)
(excepting from automatic stay the foreclosure of security interest held by the
Secretary of Commerce in a fishing facility); id. § 365(h)(2), (i) (allowing rejection of
timeshare interest); id. § 523(a)(2), (6) (disallowing discharge of debt for property
obtained by fraud or for debt for malicious injury to property of another entity); id. §
548(d)(2)(A) (defining value of property of debtor in connection with the trustee's
power to avoid fraudulent transfers); id. § 741(7) (defining securities contract in a
stockbroker liquidation).
44. See id. § 101(10) (defining "creditor" as an "entity that has a claim against the
debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor").
45. Under section 101,
(5) "claim" means(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach
gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable
remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured,
disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured.
Id. § 101.
46. See id. § 101(9). The section defines a "corporation" to
(A) include[] (i) association having a power or privilege that a private
corporation, but not an individual or a partnership, possesses; (ii)
partnership association organized under a law that makes only the capital
subscribed responsible for the debts of such association; (iii) joint-stock
company; (iv) unincorporated company or association; or (v) business trust;
but (B) does not include limited partnership.
Id.
47. See id. § 101(54) (defining "transfer" as "every mode, direct or indirect,
absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with
property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security
interest and foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption").
48. See id. § 101 (37) (defining "lien" to mean "charge against or interest in
property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation").
49. See id. § 101(51) (defining "security interest" to mean "lien created by an
agreement").
50. See id. § 365 (providing that the trustee may assume or reject unexpired
leases).
51. See id.
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a matter of statutory command, federal courts must in many instances
follow and apply state law.
Underlying the Code's express and implicit reliance on state law is
an important issue. In enacting the Code, to what extent may
Congress overrule state law and to what extent must Congress defer to
state law? The resolution of this issue depends on the constitutional
limits of bankruptcy law. Defining these limits is essential to
preserving our federal system. The remainder of this article describes
these constitutional limits and analyzes how well the Code has
complied with them.
II. THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE "SUBJECT OF
BANKRUPTCIES"

Under the Constitution, Congress may "establish... uniform Laws
on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States."52
There has been little analysis of the limits of Congress's power under
the Bankruptcy Clause. 3 Nevertheless, the meaning and limits to
Congress's Bankruptcy Power are not hard to discern.54 I conclude
that the "subject of Bankruptcies" means the subject of adjusting the
existing relationship between a debtor who is insolvent in some sense 5
and the debtor's creditors.

52. U.S. Const. art. 1,§ 8, cl.
4.
53. See Thomas E. Plank, The Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, 63 Tenn. L.
Rev. 487 (1996) (arguing that the original understanding of the Bankruptcy Clause
has not changed since the adoption of the Constitution) [hereinafter, Plank
Constitutional Limits].
54. The Supreme Court and a few other authorities have suggested that the
Bankruptcy Clause has an indeterminate or unlimited meaning. See Ry. Labor
Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 466 (1982) (quoting Wright v. Union
Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 513-14 (1938)) (suggesting that the '"subject of
bankruptcies is incapable of final definition'); Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws
of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 64 (1973)
[hereinafter Bankruptcy Commission Report] (stating that "[t]here has also been a
continuing expansion of the meaning of the word 'bankruptcies' as used in the
Constitution that has legitimated evolutions in bankruptcy law, such as the
introduction of discharge and arrangement and reorganization provisions, since the
time of the adoption of the Constitution"); Frank R. Kennedy, Bankruptcy and the
Constitution, in Blessings of Liberty: The Constitution and the Practice of Law 131,
137-38 (1988) (stating that relying on the scope of the bankruptcy power was
equivalent to "according nearly conclusive effect to Congressional enactments on the
subject of bankruptcy. When the variety of the provisions enacted by Congress and
the frequency and range of attacks on their constitutionality are considered, it must
be concluded that the courts have indeed come close to permitting Congress complete
freedom in formulating and enacting bankruptcy legislation."). The idea that the
Bankruptcy Clause has an indeterminate or unlimited meaning, however, cannot be
correct if the Federal Government is to continue to be one of enumerated powers
under the Constitution.
55. See infra note 115 and accompanying text (describing both cash flow
insolvency and balance sheet insolvency).
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This interpretation of the "subject of Bankruptcies" derives from
both the understanding of the concept of "bankruptcies" at the time
of the adoption of the Constitution and the different legislative
responses to bankruptcies that preceded that adoption. First, in the
latter half of the eighteenth century, the term "bankruptcy" was
synonymous with "insolvency." Both "bankruptcy" and "insolvency"
were defined in the dictionaries of the day as the condition of being
unable to pay one's debts.56
Similarly, the terms were used
interchangeably in different kinds of legal documents.5 7 Linguistically,
56. See, e.g., 1 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (London
1755) (unpaginated) (defining "bankrupt" as an adjective as "[i]n debt beyond the
power of payment" and a noun as a "man in debt beyond the power of payment" and
defining "insolvent" and "insolvency" respectively as "[u]nable to pay debts
contracted" and "[i]nability to pay debts."); 1 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the
English Language (5th ed. London 1773) (same); 1 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of
the English Language (8th ed. London 1799) (unpaginated) (same). The 1775 fourth
edition of Johnson's Dictionary of the English Language was a part of Thomas
Jefferson's library. 5 Catalogue of the Library of Thomas Jefferson 133-34 (E.
Millicent Sowerby ed., 4th ed. 1959); see also William Perry, The Royal Standard
English Dictionary (3d Worcester ed., 1st Am. ed. 1794) ("Bankrupt,... one who
cannot pay his debts"; "Bankruptcy .... The state of a bankrupt"; "Solvency,.. . an
ability to pay"; "Solvent, a. able to pay debts"); 1 Thomas Sheridan, Dictionary of the
English Language (3d ed. London 1790) ("Bankruptcy f. The state of a man broken,
or bankrupt; the act of declaring one's self bankrupt"; "Bankrupt, f. A person
incapable of paying his debts; one against whom a commission of bankruptcy is
awarded"; "Bankrupt, a. In debt beyond the power of payment"; "Insolvent, a.
Unable to pay"; "Insolvency, f. Inability to pay debts"); Thomas Sheridan, Dictionary
of the English Language (6th ed. Philadelphia 1796) (same); see generally Plank,
ConstitutionalLimits, supra note 53, at 529-32.
57. See infra text accompanying note 61; see also 7 Laws of Virginia 673, 681
(1820) (indexing the short-lived Virginia discharge statute, ch. 8, Nov. Sess., 1762 Va.
Laws, discussed infra note 92, under "Bankrupt," describing it as "Act for relief of
insolvent debtors, on the principles of the bankrupt law," and also indexing the law
under "Insolvents"); Miller v. Hall, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) *229 (Pa. 1788), reprinted in Pa.
Reports 240 (4th ed. 1880) (in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in early 1788
referred to Maryland's 1787 insolvency act discussed infra in text accompanying note
103, as being "in the nature of a general bankrupt law"); see also Kurt H. Nadelmann,
On the Origin of the Bankruptcy Clause, 1 Am. J. Legal Hist. 215, 222 n.29 (1957)
(describing the actions of the Connecticut General Assembly over five sessions from
1787-1789 on a petition by Elijah Buell for a discharge from his debts, the records of
which described the petitioner initially as requesting "an Act of Insolvency" and later
requesting "a special Act of Bankruptcy").
In Sturges v. Crowninshield,4 U.S. (17 Wheat.) 122 (1819), the Supreme Court
rejected any constitutional distinction between a "bankrupt" law and an "insolvency"
law. In this case, a Massachusetts creditor challenged the discharge of debts under an
1811 New York statute on the ground that the constitutional grant to Congress to
enact bankruptcy laws precluded the state from enacting a "bankruptcy" law, that is, a
law discharging debts. Id. at 124-31. Although noting the differences between the
two types of bankruptcy legislation, the Court stated, "This difficulty of discriminating
with any accuracy between insolvent and bankrupt laws, would lead to the opinion,
that a bankrupt law may contain those regulations which are generally found in
insolvent laws; and that an insolvent law may contain those which are common to a
bankrupt law." Id. at 195. The Court did hold, however, that the New York act
impaired the obligation of contract in violation of Article 1, Section 10 of the
Constitution. Id.
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then, the "subject of Bankruptcies" in the Constitution is the subject
of a debtor who is unable to pay his, her, or its creditors.
Second, by the time of the adoption of the Constitution, the English
and American governments had responded to the problem of debtors'
inability to pay their debts by enacting three different groups of
bankruptcy laws: (1) the English Bankrupt Acts, (2) the English
Insolvency Acts, and (3) a wide variety of American laws. Though
these laws differed in some respects, they all shared common features:
they authorized a collective creditor proceeding against an insolvent
debtor involving all the creditors in place of the creditor enforcement
action of each creditor against the insolvent debtor.
Outside of bankruptcy, each creditor pursued its own collection
actions against a debtor who did not pay his or her debts. In
eighteenth-century England, to collect an unpaid debt, creditors could
seize and force the sale of the goods of the debtor and had a limited
ability to reach the productive aspects of real estate, although they
could not force the sale of real estate.58 Jurisdictions in America
followed the English practice, although most states allowed creditors
to force the sale of real estate as well as goods.5 Creditors who were
the first to seize the executable property of the debtor received full or
partial payment, while later creditors received nothing. Creditors who
remained unpaid, however, could continue to seize property that the
debtor later acquired. Creditors could also imprison the debtor until
the debt was paid, on the theory that'a refusal to pay debts was a
voluntary choice by the debtor." This system worked very poorly for
58. Creditors' remedies were limited to the writ of fieri facias, which authorized
the sheriff to seize the tangible goods of the debtor and sell enough of them to pay the
debt; the writ of levari facias, which enabled the sheriff to seize the personal property
of the debtor and the rents from the debtor's real property to satisfy the debt (but not
the right to possess or cause the sale of the debtor's lands); the writ of elegit, which
allowed delivery of the goods to the creditor at an appraised value in satisfaction of
the debt and, if there remained a deficiency, gave the creditor possession of one half
of the debtor's lands until the debts were repaid (but did not allow the creditor to
force the sale of the debtor's lands); or the writ of capias ad satisfaciendum, which
imprisoned the debtor until the debt was paid. See 3 William Blackstone,
Commentaries *414, *417-19.
59. See Peter J. Coleman, Debtors and Creditors in America: Insolvency,
Imprisonment for Debt, and Bankruptcy, 1607-1900 at 4, 15 (1974).
60. Imprisonment for debt was an important creditor collection device in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It reflected a common belief that the refusal to
pay debts was willful. The intent was not to punish debtors, but to provide an
incentive for debtors who owned property which could not be reached by the legal
process of the day to pay their debts. See generally Jay Cohen, The History of
Imprisonment for Debt and its Relation to the Development of Discharge in
Bankruptcy, 3 J. Legal Hist. 153, 155 (1982); Coleman, supra note 59, at 5. Debtors of
substance sometimes preferred imprisonment, because once the body of the person
was taken in execution on the writ, no other writ could be issued against his or her
goods or lands, and creditors also used this writ because they could not force the sale
of the debtor's lands. See supra note 58. In addition, creditors could not levy on
negotiable instruments and certain other intangible property. See Cohen, supra, at
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the creditors of a debtor who had insufficient assets to repay all of his
or her creditors.
In 1763, Governor Bernard of Massachusetts specifically
complained of this state of affairs in his message to the London Board
of Trade requesting approval of a law directed against absconding
debtors:
This province has long laboured under the want of a Bankrupt
Act.... As it has been of late, every Insolvency has afforded
instances of great partiality and injustice. The Common Method has
been for the Creditors who get the earliest advice of a persons [sic]
becoming insolvent to sue out attachments against the goods and
credit of the insolvent, according to the custom of the Country, and
help himself to such part thereof as he pleased. A general scramble
ensues, there is no regular audit of the Accounts of the Creditors;
The goods are sold in a hurry at a low value; and great part of the
effects of the debtor are spent 61in law proceedings and contests
between contending attachments.
The bankruptcy laws of the eighteenth century replaced the race to
the courthouse with a collective proceeding under the control of
either the creditors or an administrative or judicial official when the
debtor had become unable to repay his or her debts. These laws
mandated the gathering, liquidation, and distribution of the debtor's
property on a pro-rata basis to creditors in satisfaction of the debts.
They also provided some form of debtor relief, such as release from
debtor's prison and in some cases discharge of existing debts. In a few
instances, legislation imposed on all creditors an arrangement
negotiated with a majority of creditors that provided for future
payment to the creditors and allowed the debtor to retain his or her
property in accordance with the arrangement. Also, some of these
bankruptcy laws allowed the creditors to reach more property than
they could under nonbankruptcy law.62
Of the three groups of bankruptcy laws, the English Bankrupt Acts
were the most developed. These Acts consisted of the 1570 Statute of
13 Elizabeth,63 the 1604 Statute of 1 James,64 the 1623 Statute of 21
154-55; Ian P.H. Duffy, English Bankrupts 1571-1861, 24 Am. J. Legal Hist. 283, 285
(1980) [hereinafter, Duffy, English Bankrupts]; Israel Treiman, Acts of Bankruptcy: A
Medieval Concept in Modern Bankruptcy Law, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 189, 195 n.21 (1938).
The intangible property that was not subject to execution and levy included
"annuities, bank notes, bonds, book debts, copyhold land, negotiable instruments,
shares and stocks in public funds." See Duffy, English Bankrupts, supra at 285.
61. See 4 Acts and Resolves, Public and Private, of the Province of Massachusetts
Bay 793 (1881); see also George P. Bauer, The Movement Against Imprisonment for
Debt in the United States app. c (1935) (unpublished dissertation, Harvard
University); see also Coleman, supra note 59, at 46-47.
62. See infra notes 76, 80, 89-98.
63. 13 Eliz., c. 7 (1570) (Eng.). This was the first act that allowed creditors to
begin a bankruptcy case against "merchants" who committed certain "acts of
bankruptcy." The English Parliament passed the first Bankrupt Act in 1542 during
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James,65 and the 1732 Statute of 5 George 11,66 as extended and
amended." These Acts-frequently referred to as "Bankrupt" and
not "Bankruptcy" acts 6 -provided a detailed procedure for adjusting
the reign of King Henry VIII. 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 4 (1542-1543) (Eng.). This act
authorized creditors to initiate a bankruptcy proceeding against persons who
committed certain fraudulent acts. The 1542 Act is generally considered the first
English bankruptcy act. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy
Laws in the United States, 3 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 5, 7 (1995) [hereinafter Tabb,
History]; Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge,
65 Am. Bankr. L.J. 325, 331 (1991) [hereinafter Tabb, Discharge]. Although the 1542
Act remained in effect until 1824, the later acts so changed and amplified the
bankruptcy law that it retained little independent significance. See Bromley v.
Goodere, 1 Atk. 75, 77, 26 Eng. Rep. 49, 50-51 (Ch. 1743) (allowing interest to
creditors where bankrupt's estate is sufficient to pay all creditors); I Edward
Christian, The Origin, Progress, and Present Practice of the Bankrupt Law Both in
England and in Ireland 9 (London, W. Clarke & Sons 2d ed. 1818). Christian called
the Statute of 13 Elizabeth, as of 1818, "the foundation of all the bankrupt law." Id.
at 10. All citations to and quotations from English statutes, including the year of
enactment, are from the Statutes at Large (Owen Ruffhead, ed., vols. 1-9, 1762-1765,
reprinted 1769-1770, vol. 10-14, 1771-1786).
64. See Tabb, Discharge, supra note 63, at 331; 1 Jam., c. 15 (1604) (Eng.). This
act amended the Statute of 13 Elizabeth. Id. § 3; see also Thomas E. Plank, Why
Bankruptcy Judges Need Not and Should Not be Article III Judges, 72 Am. Bankr. L.J.
567, 581 & n.88, 585-86 & nn.107-13 (1998) [hereinafter, Plank, Bankruptcy Judges].
65. See Tabb, supra note 63; 21 Jam., c. 19 (1623) (Eng.). This act amended the
Statute of 13 Elizabeth and the Statute of 1 James. 21 Jam., c. 19, § 3 (1623) (Eng.);
see also Plank, Bankruptcy Judges, supra note 64, at 581 & n.88, 586 & nn.114-18.
66. 5 Geo. 2, c. 30 (1732) (Eng.). The 1732 Statute of 5 George II revised and
expanded, without significant change, several earlier Bankrupt Acts that had expired,
principally the 1705 Statute of Anne, 4 Ann., c. 17 (1705) (Eng.), which itself
modernized the bankruptcy system. The Statute of 4 Anne was to expire after several
years, but it was extended periodically by Parliament until several years before the
enactment of the 1732 Act. See Tabb, Discharge,supra note 63, at 340-41 & n.96.
67. The 1732 Act remained in effect until the end of the session of Parliament
ending after June 24, 1735. 5 Geo. 2, c. 30, § 49 (1732) (Eng.). It was further
continued by 9 Geo. 2, c. 18, § 2 (1736) (Eng.); 16 Geo. 2, c. 27 (1743) (Eng.); 24 Geo.
2, c. 57, § 8 (1751) (Eng.); 31 Geo. 2, c. 35 (1757) (Eng.); 4 Geo. 3, c. 36, § 1 (1763)
(Eng.); 12 Geo. 3, c. 47, § I (1772) (Eng.); 16 Geo. 3, c. 54 (1776) (Eng.); 21 Geo. 3, c.
29, § 8 (1781) (Eng.); 26 Geo. 3, c. 80, § 2 (1786) (Eng.); 28 Geo. 3, c. 24, § 2 (1788)
(Eng.); 34 Geo. 3, c. 57 (1794) (Eng.); and 37 Geo. 3, c. 124 (1797) (Eng.), when it was
made perpetual. In addition, several acts made minor amendments to the provisions
of 5 Geo. 2, c. 30. See 19 Geo. 2, c. 32 (1746) (Eng.) (protecting bona fide transferees
of the bankrupt's property before notice of the act of bankruptcy, and allowing
sureties to be admitted as creditors); 24 Geo. 2, c. 57, § 9 (1751) (Eng.) (voiding
certificates based on fictitious debts). See also Tabb, History, supra note 63, at 12;
Tabb, Discharge,supra note 63, at 340, 344.
68. See 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 4 (1542-1543) (Eng.) (entitled "An Act against such
Persons as do make Bankrupt"); 13 Eliz., c. 7 (1570) (Eng.) (entitled "An Act
touching Orders for Bankrupts"); see also Ex parte Bowes, 4 Ves. Jun. 168, 176, 31
Eng. Rep. 86, 90 (Ch. 1798) (containing several references to "the Bankrupt Laws");
Alexander v. Vaughan, 1 Cowp. 398, 403, 98 Eng. Rep. 1151, 1154 (K.B. 1776)
(entering a nonsuit on the grounds that the plaintiff was not a merchant or trader,
within the description of the "bankrupt laws"); William Cooke, A Compendious
System of The Bankrupt Laws (Dublin, 1786); Thomas Cooper, The Bankrupt Law of
America Compared with the Bankrupt Law of England (Philadelphia, John
Thompson 1801); Edward Green, The Spirit of the Bankrupt Laws (London, 4th ed.
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the relationship between certain debtors and their creditors. A
creditor6 9 could initiate a bankruptcy proceeding against a merchant7"
who had committed an act of bankruptcy7 1 by filing a petition with the
Lord Chancellor.72 The Lord Chancellor appointed "Commissioners
of Bankrupt" to supervise the proceedings.73 Assignees appointed by
the commissioners or a majority of the creditors74 gathered and
liquidated the debtor's property 75 and distributed the proceeds to
creditors who established their debts before the commissioners.76
Beginning in 1705, cooperating debtors could receive a discharge of
1780). Other sources, however, sometimes referred to the "bankrupt laws" as the
"bankruptcy laws." See, e.g., 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *473 (referring to
the English Bankrupt Acts as "laws of bankruptcy"), and one of the elements for a
"commission of bankrupt" was the commission of an act commonly referred to as an
"act of bankruptcy." See infra note 117 (describing the "acts of bankruptcy").
69. One creditor who was owed at least £100 could file a petition, as could two
creditors owed a total of £150, and three or more owed a total of £200. See 5 Geo. 2,
c. 30, § 23 (1732) (Eng.); see also Plank, Bankruptcy Judges, supra note 64, at 576, 587
& n.127.
70. Under the Statute of 13 Elizabeth, a bankrupt had to be a "Merchant or other
Person using or exercising the Trade of Merchandize by way of Bargaining,
Exchange, Rechange, Bartry, Chevisance, or otherwise, in Gross or by retail, or
seeking his or her Trade of Living by Buying and Selling." 13 Eliz., c. 7, § 1, cls. (2),
(3) (1570) (Eng.). This definition proved to be troublesome for close cases, and later
statutes and court decisions amplified and expanded the definition so that by the end
of the eighteenth century, almost any type of business activity not closely dependent
upon the ownership of land qualified one to be a merchant. See Cohen, supra note 60,
at 160, 162-63; Lawrence M. Friedman & Thadeus F. Niemira, The Concept of the
"Trader" in Early Bankruptcy Law, 5 St. Louis U. L.J. 223, 233-46 (1958); Plank,
ConstitutionalLimits, supra note 53, at 507-10; Tabb, Discharge, supranote 63, at 344.
71. See infra note 117 (describing the "acts of bankruptcy").
72. See 13 Eliz., c. 7, § 2 (1570) (Eng.).
73. See id.
74. The commissioners could appoint provisional assignees to receive all of the
bankrupt's property. 5 Geo. 2, c. 30, § 30 (1732) (Eng.). At the first meeting of
creditors, the creditors could elect new assignees. See id. §§ 26, 30.
75. See 13 Eliz., c. 7, § 2, cls. (2)-(9) (1570) (Eng.); 5 Geo. 2, c. 30, § 1 (1732)
(Eng.). The property included property that was not subject to nonbankruptcy
creditor collection actions, see supra note 58, such as real estate. See 13 Eliz., c. 7, § 2,
cls. (3), (4) (1570) (Eng.) (the property of the estate included "Lands, Tenements,
Hereditaments, as well Copy or Customary Hold as Freehold" held by the bankrupt);
5 Geo. 2, c. 30, § 1 (1732) (Eng.) (property of the estate includes all "Estate" of the
bankrupt).
76. The statute provided:
[A]nd the said Commissioners, or the major Part of them, shall order such
Part of the neat Produce of the said Bankrupt's Estate, as by such Accounts
or otherwise shall appear to be in the Hands of the said Assignees, as they
or the major Part of them shall think fit, to be forthwith divided amongst
such of the Bankrupt's Creditors, who have duly proved their Debts under
such Commission, in Proportion to their several and respective Debts ....
5 Geo. 2, c. 30, § 33 (1732) (Eng.). The 1542 Statute of Henry VIII and the 1570
Statute of 13 Elizabeth also provided for the gathering and sale of the bankrupt's
property and a pro rata distribution of the proceeds to creditors to satisfy their claims,
although in much less detail. 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 4, para. 1 (1542-1543) (Eng.); 13 Eliz.,
c. 7, § 2, cl. (10) (1570) (Eng.); see also Louis Edward Levinthal, The Early History of
English Bankruptcy, 67 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 14-17 (1919).
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their debts with the approval of a supermajority of creditors 7 and
could receive a small percentage of their property that would
otherwise be distributed to creditors.7 8
The second group of bankruptcy laws of the eighteenth century
consists of the Insolvency Acts periodically enacted by the English
Parliament, typically entitled "An Act for the Relief of Insolvent
Debtors. '79 Under these acts, a debtor imprisoned because of a
failure to repay his or her debts could obtain release from prison by
filing a petition with the justice of the peace. The debtor's real and
personal property was assigned to assignees who liquidated the
property and distributed the proceeds pro rata to the creditors in
payment of his or her debts."' The creditors could no longer imprison
the debtors for the preexisting debts. The Insolvency Acts did not
discharge the debts, and creditors could execute on any future goods
acquired by the debtor to satisfy the preexisting debts. 1 In the
beginning of the eighteenth century, these acts applied only to those

77. See 4 Ann., c. 17, § 7 (1705) (Eng.), as amended in 1706 by 5 Ann., c. 22 (1706)
(Eng.), which conditioned a discharge on the consent of eighty percent of the
creditors in both number and value of the debts, id. § 2. The provision was continued
in 5 Geo. 2, c. 30, §§ 7, 10 (1732) (Eng.).
78. The Statute of 5 George II provided an elaborate formula for the allowance to
the bankrupt of the "Neat Product" of the bankrupt's estate received or recovered by
the commissioners: 5%, not to exceed £200, if the creditors received 50%; 7 % not to
exceed £250 if the creditors received 62.5%; 10% not to exceed £300 if the creditors
received 75%; and only what the commissioners thought fit, not to exceed 3%, if the
creditors received less than 50%. 5 Geo. 2, c. 30, § 7 (1732) (Eng.).
79. See, e.g., 2 & 3 Ann., c. 16 (1703) (Eng.) ("An Act for the Discharge out of
Prison such Insolvent Debtors" who will serve in the army or navy); 6 Geo., c. 22
(1719) (Eng.) (act for "Relief of insolvent Debtors"); 11 Geo., c. 21 (1724) (Eng.)
(same); 2 Geo. 2, c. 20 (1729) (Eng.) (act for "Relief of Insolvent Debtors"); 21 Geo.
2, c. 31 (1748) (Eng.) (same); 28 Geo. 2, c. 13 (1755) (Eng.) (same); 9 Geo. 3, c. 26
(1769) (Eng.) (same); 12 Geo. 3, c. 23 (1772) (Eng.) (same); 14 Geo. 3, c. 77 (1774)
(Eng.) (same); 16 Geo. 3, c. 38 (1776) (Eng.) (same); 18 Geo. 3, c. 52 (1778) (Eng.)
(same); 21 Geo. 3, c. 63 (1781) (Eng.) ("An Act for the Discharge of certain Insolvent
Debtors"). According to Charles Tabb, the first of such acts was 22 & 23 Car. 2, c. 20
(1670) (Eng), and later acts included 2 W. & M., sess. 2, c. 15 (1690) (Eng.); 5 & 6 W.
& M., c. 8 (1694) (Eng.); 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 12 (1696) (Eng.); 8 & 9 Will. 3, c. 18 (1697)
(Eng.); lAnn., stat. 1, c. 25 (1701) (Eng.); 2 & 3 Ann., c. 16 (1703) (Eng.); see also
Tabb, History, supra note 63, at 12 n.47.
80. See, e.g., 28 Geo. 2, c. 13, § 3 (1755) (Eng.); 9 Geo. 3, c. 26 §§ 6, 11 (1769)
(Eng.); 12 Geo. 3, c. 23, §§ 6, 12 (1.772) (Eng.); 14 Geo. 3, c. 77, §§ 6, 12 (1774) (Eng.);
16 Geo. 3, c. 38, §§ 6, 14 (1776) (Eng.); 18 Geo. 3, c. 52, §§ 6, 14 (1778) (Eng.); 21 Geo.
3, c. 63, §§ 6, 15 (1781) (Eng.). Hence, a debtor seeking relief had to relinquish
property that could not be sold under nonbankruptcy creditor collection law. See
supra note 58.
81. See, e.g., 2 & 3 Ann., c. 16 (1703) (Eng.) (summary of provisions); 6 Geo., c. 22
(1719) (Eng.); 11 Geo., c. 21 (1724) (Eng.); 2 Geo. 2, c. 20 (1729) (Eng.); 21 Geo. 2, c.
31 (1748) (Eng.); 28 Geo. 2, c. 13, §§ 3, 18, 20, 21 (1755) (Eng.); 9 Geo. 3, c. 26, §§ 4,
11, 27, 33 (1769) (Eng.); 12 Geo. 3, c. 23, §§ 4, 12, 27, 28, 34 (1772) (Eng.); 14 Geo. 3,
c. 77, §§ 4, 12, 28, 29, 34 (1774) (Eng.); 16 Geo. 3, c. 38, §§ 4, 14, 33, 34, 41 (1776)
(Eng.); 18 Geo. 3, c. 52, 88 4, 14, 33, 38, 45 (1778) (Eng.); 21 Geo. 3, c. 63, §§ 5,15, 32,
33 (1781) (Eng.).
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with a small amount of debt (£50 or £lOO).82 Toward the end of the
century, the maximum amount of allowable debt grew to £1,000£2,000. The acts also induced creditors holding debts that exceeded
the maximum to comply with their terms.s3
To be sure, the English Insolvency Acts differed from the English
Bankrupt Acts on some important matters. Under the Bankrupt
Acts, debtors received a release from prison and a discharge of their
debts; under the Insolvency Acts, debtors received only a release from
prison. The Bankrupt Acts operated prospectively for debtors who
became insolvent after the enactment of the Acts. With the exception
of the Lord's Act,84 the Insolvency Acts did not operate prospectively.
They released only those debtors in prison as of a specified date.85
82. See Treiman, supra note 60, at 195 n.22 (citing 2 W. & M., sess. 2, c. 15, § 9
(1690) (Eng.) (limiting the benefits of that insolvency act to debtors with unpaid debts
of less than £100)); see also 2 & 3 Ann., c. 16 (1703) (Eng.) (limiting relief to debtors
who did not owe more than £100 to one person and who agreed to serve or procured
another to serve in the British army or navy); 6 Geo., c. 22 (1719) (Eng.) (limited to
debtors who did not owe more than £50 to one person); 11 Geo., c. 21 (1724) (Eng.)
(debtors owing debts to the Crown and debts of £100 or more to one person were not
released).
83. Creditors holding debts greater than the maximum who did not consent to the
release of the debtor were required to pay for the maintenance of the debtor in
prison. If they did not pay, the prisoner was released. See, e.g., 2 Geo. 2, c. 20 (1729)
(Eng.) (no release for debt to the King or debt of more than £500 to any one creditor,
unless the creditor consented); 21 Geo. 2, c. 31 (1748) (Eng.) (same); 28 Geo. 2, c. 13,
§ 31 (1755) (Eng.) (same; except creditors who did not consent to release had to pay a
sum for the maintenance of the prisoner; if the sum were not paid, then the prisoner
was released) 9 Geo. 3, c. 26, § 40 (1.769) (Eng.); 12 Geo. 3, c. 23, § 42 (1772) (Eng.)
(same); 14 Geo. 3, c. 77, § 42 (1774) (Eng.) (same, except debt limit raised to £2,000
and release for debt to King allowed if Privy Council agreed); 16 Geo. 3, c. 38, §§ 49,
50 (1776) (Eng.) (same, except no release for debt to King, and debt limit of £1,000 to
any one person); 18 Geo. 3, c. 52, §§ 55, 56 (1778) (Eng.) (same); 21 Geo. 3, c. 63, 88 5,
13, 48 (1781) (Eng.) (debt limit £500 but not released for debts to Crown).
84. The Statute of 32 Geo. 2, c. 28 (1758) (Eng.), a general insolvency act for
debtors in prison for sums of less than £100, provided for the assignment of the
debtor's property to creditors and release from prison. If the creditors did not
consent to the release, they were required to pay the fees for continuing the debtor's
imprisonment. If they failed to pay, the debtor was released from prison. Id. §§ 13,
14. This act also provided a new remedy to creditors against debtors not eligible for a
commission of bankrupt. Upon notice to the debtor and other creditors by whose
action the debtor was imprisoned, the creditor could compel a debtor not seeking
release from debtor's prison to give an account of his or her property and to assign
the property for the benefit of the petitioning creditor and other consenting creditors.
Id. § 17. If the debtor refused, he would be transported to a colony in America for
indentured service for seven years. Id.
85. See, e.g., 6 Geo., c. 22 (1719) (Eng.) (releasing debtors in prison on June 24,
1719, for existing debts); 11 Geo., c. 21 (1724) (Eng.) (September 29, 1724); 2 Geo. 2,
c. 20 (1729) (Eng.) (September 29, 1728); 21 Geo. 2, c. 31 (1748) (Eng.) (January 1,
1747); 28 Geo. 2, c. 13 (1755) (Eng.) (January 1, 1755); 9 Geo. 3, c. 26 (1769) (Eng.);
12 Geo. 3, c. 23 (1772) (Eng.) (January 1, 1772); 14 Geo. 3, c. 77 (1774) (Eng.) (April
28, 1774); 16 Geo. 3, c. 38 (1776) (Eng.) (January 22, 1776); 18 Geo. 3, c. 52 (1778)
(Eng.) (January 28, 1778); 21 Geo. 3, c. 63 (1781) (Eng.) (persons in prison on January
1, 1781; also persons who had escaped during disturbances on June 2 through June 8,
1780 that destroyed several jails and who surrendered or offered to surrender by
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Only merchants were eligible for relief under the Bankrupt Acts. The
Insolvency Acts applied to nonmerchants and to merchants not
eligible under the Bankrupt Acts. Proceedings under the Bankrupt
Acts were nominally involuntary, that is, initiated by the creditors;
under the Insolvency Act, the debtors, not the creditors, initiated the
proceedings.
Because the Bankrupt Acts were more fully developed and created
a more comprehensive system, the Bankrupt Acts have received more
attention as important sources of American bankruptcy law, and the
Insolvency Acts have received insufficient attention.
This is
unfortunate for two reasons. First, both the Bankrupt Acts and the
Insolvency Acts incorporated the essential features of bankruptcy law:
(i) a summary proceeding providing (ii) the gathering, liquidation, and
distribution of the debtor's property (iii) to satisfy creditor claims on a
pro rata basis and (iv) significant debtor relief.
Second, the differences between the Bankrupt Acts and the
Insolvency Acts are less significant than they appear. Although
bankruptcy proceedings under the Bankrupt Acts were only
nominally involuntary, it was easy and commonplace for a debtor to
induce a creditor to initiate a bankruptcy proceeding. 6 The limitation
to merchants proved to be so unstable that almost any person engaged
in a business that did not depend upon the ownership of land could be
a merchant." Release from prison provided important and effective
relief to debtors even without a discharge because of the limitations in
the eighteenth century on individual creditor collection remedies."8
Indeed, the end of the eighteenth century saw serious efforts to merge
the Bankrupt Acts and the Insolvency Acts. 9
September 1, 1780).
86. See Plank, ConstitutionalLimits, supra note 53, at 510-12.

87. See Cohen, supra note 60, at 160; Friedman & Niemira, supra note 70, at 233-

46; Plank, Constitutional Limits, supra note 53, at 507-11; Tabb, Discharge, supra note

63, at 344. Indeed, I believe that the limitation to "merchants" reflected more a
desire of the landed gentry in England to prevent the liquidation of land to pay debts
than a sensible expression of bankruptcy policy. See Plank, Constitutional Limits,
supra note 53, at 507-11.
88. See supra note 58 (describing the limitations on the types of property interests
of the debtor on which a creditor could execute).
89. For example, in 1783, James Bland Burges suggested a reform that melded
many of the features of the Bankrupt Acts and the Insolvency Acts, such as abolishing
the distinction between merchants and nonmerchants, replacing a simple requirement
of debtor insolvency for "acts of bankruptcy" as a jurisdictional requirement for a
proceeding, and abolishing creditor approval for the debtor's discharge. James B.
Burges, Considerations on the Law of Insolvency: With a Proposal for Reform 318-23,
342-45, 348-53, 387-89 (London, T. Cadell 1783). Burges's proposals are also
discussed in Ian P.H. Duffy, Bankruptcy and Insolvency in London During the
Industrial Revolution 44-45, 84-85 (1985), and in Duffy, English Bankrupts, supra
note 60, at 283, 290 & n.44. Burges was a barrister and a commissioner of bankrupt
and later a member of Parliament. See Duffy, supra note 60, at 44 n.133.
These were not entirely new ideas. In 1697, Daniel DeFoe proposed a
voluntary bankruptcy system in which the debtor received a full discharge of debts.
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In eighteenth-century America, the colonies and states enacted a
wide variety of bankruptcy laws that I lump into the third group of

eighteenth-century

bankruptcy legislation.

Further, the same

jurisdictions experimented with different types of laws at different
times. 90 Most jurisdictions enacted statutes providing relief upon a

petition by debtors or creditors and liquidation and distribution of the
debtor's property similar to the English Insolvency Acts. Most of
these statutes only released debtors from prison. 91 A few jurisdictions,

however, allowed the discharge of debts with the consent of some or
all of the creditors. 92 A very few enacted short-lived acts that allowed

See Daniel Defoe, An Essay upon Projects 197 (1697), also discussed in Plank,
Constitutional Limits, supra note 53, at 503-05, and Robert Weisberg, Commercial
Morality, the Merchant Character,and the History of the Voidable Preference, 39 Stan.
L. Rev. 3, 9 (1986).
90. For a more detailed summary of this American legislation, see Plank,
Constitutional Limits, supra note 53, at 518-25, and Plank, Bankruptcy Judges, supra
note 64, at 600-06.
91. See, e.g., An Act for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors, within this Government,
ch. 76, 1740 Del. Laws, amended by ch. 118, 1751 Del. Laws; An Act for the Relief of
Insolvent Debtors, ch. 28, Mar. Sess., 1774 Md. Laws (three years duration but
continued by subsequent acts until it expired 1787, revived 1788, and continued until
at least 1810); An Act for the Relief of Insolvent Persons, with respect to the
Imprisonment of Their Persons, ch. 22, 9th Sess., 1786 N.Y. Laws (Mar. 31, 1786)
(total debts not more than £15); An Act for the Relief of Insolvent Persons, with
respect to the Imprisonment of Their Persons, ch. 98, 10th Sess., 1787 N.Y. Laws
(Apr. 20, 1787) (same); An Act for Giving Relief in Cases of Insolvency, ch. 92, 11th
Sess., 1788 N.Y. Laws (Mar. 21, 1788) (requiring consent of three-fourths by value of
creditors); An Act Directing the Manner of Levying Executions, and for Relief of
Poor Prisoners for Debt, ch. 37, 1705 Va. Laws (debts under 10 pounds money or
2,000 pounds in tobacco), in 3 Statutes at Large Being a Collection of the Laws of
Virginia 385, 386-88 (William Waller Hening ed., 1823) [hereinafter Laws of Virginia];
An Act Declaring the Law Concerning Executions, and for Relief of Insolvent
Debtors, ch. 12, 1748 Va. Laws, §§ 24, 26 (effective June 1, 1751), in 5 Laws of
Virginia, supra, at 526, 589 (1819); ch. 1, 1753 Va. Laws, § 31, in 6 Laws of Virginia,
supra, at 325, 342-43 (1819); ch. 22, 1769 Va. Laws, § 7, in 8 Laws of Virginia supra, at
326, 329 (1821); see also Coleman, supra note 59, at 79 (discussing a shortlived 1765
Connecticut act that also discharged liens); id. at 208-10 (discussing Delaware laws
enacted during 1734-1808); id. at 234 (discussing Georgia laws enacted during 17661770); id. at 164-65 (discussing Maryland laws enacted during 1708-1711, 1725-1727,
1733, 1774-1787, 1788-1817); id. at 40-42 (discussing Massachusetts laws enacted
during 1698-1725, periodically during 1727-1787, and permanently thereafter); id. at
56-57 (discussing New Hampshire laws enacted during 1767-1776, 1782-1791); id. at
132-35 (discussing New Jersey laws enacted during 1686, periodically from 1730 to
1771); id. at 107-08, 115-16 (discussing New York laws enacted during 1730, 17321734, 1743, 1747, 1750, 1751, 1756, 1776, 1786, 1787); id. at 218-20 (discussing North
Carolina laws enacted during 1749-1773); id. at 143-45, 147 (discussing Pennsylvania
laws enacted during 1730, 1770, 1784-1793); id. at 91 (discussing Rhode Island laws
enacted in the year 1745); id. at 66-67 (discussing Vermont laws enacted during 17821797); id. at 195-96 (discussing Virginia laws enacted periodically beginning in 1705).
92. See, e.g., An Act for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors, 1771 N.J. Laws, in 5 Laws
of the Royal Colony of New Jersey 1770-1775, at 81-86 (Bernard Bush ed., 1986)
[hereinafter Laws of New Jersey]; ch. 370, 1783 N.J. Laws, in The First Laws of the
State of New Jersey 338 (John D. Cushing ed., 1981); An Act for the Relief of
Insolvent Debtors, ch. 34, 9th Sess., 1786 N.Y. Laws (Apr. 13,1786) (general relief act
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the discharge of the debtor's debts without creditor consent.93 For
example, in early 1787, Maryland enacted "An Act Respecting
Insolvent Debtors"" that in essence resembles Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code: It provided for a voluntary petition by any
debtor;9 5 liquidation and pro rata distribution of the debtor's property

applying to "insolvent" debtors and not just debtors in prison; required consent of
debtors with three-fourths of total debt) (repealed by Act of Feb. 8, 1788, ch. 29, 11th
Sess., 1788 N.Y. Laws.); An Act for the More Effectual Relief of Insolvent Debtors,
No. 882, 1759 S.C. Laws (Apr. 7, 1759) (only discharging the debts of creditors who
agreed to accept a dividend from an assignment of the debtor's property); An Act for
the relief of insolvent debtors, for the effectual discovery and more equal distribution
of their estates, Ch. 8, Nov. Sess., 1762 Va. Laws, §§ 1,18, in 7 Laws of Virginia 549-63
(1820) (repealed Ch. 2, May Sess., 1763 Va. Laws, in 7 Laws of Virginia 643 (1820))
(providing a discharge for debtors under terms similar to the 1.732 English Bankrupt
Act of 5 George II, 5 Geo. 2, c. 30, but not limiting relief to merchant debtors, and
allowing debtors to initiate proceedings). See also Coleman, supra note 59, at 134-35
(discussing New Jersey laws enacted during 1771-1775, 1783-1787); id. at 109, 113, 123
(discussing New York, 1755-1772, 1784-1819).
93. 1775 N.J. Laws, in 5 Laws of New Jersey, supra note 92, at 321 (removing
creditor consent requirement from existing law that was to expire in 1776); An Act for
Relief of Insolvent Debtors Within This State, ch. 34, 7th Sess., 1784 N.Y. Laws (Apr.
17, 1784) (releasing and discharging debtors then in prison); Act of Nov. 24, 1784, ch.
14, 8th Sess., 1784 N.Y. Laws (same); An Act for the relief of insolvent debtors, for
the effectual discovery and more equal distribution of their estates, ch. 8, Nov. Sess.,
1762 Va. Laws, §§ 1, 18, in 7 Laws of Virginia 549-63 (William W. Hening ed., 1820)
(repealed ch. 2, May Sess., 1763 Va. Laws, in 7 Laws of Virginia 643 (William W.
Hening ed., 1820)) (providing a discharge for debtors under terms similar to the 1732
English Bankruptcy Act of 5 George 11,5 Geo. 2, c. 30, but not limiting relief to
merchant debtors, and allowing debtors to initiate proceedings); see also Coleman,
supra note 59, at 79 (discussing Connecticut laws enacted during 1765-1767); id. at 134
(discussing New Jersey laws enacted in the year 1775); id. at 218-22 (discussing North
Carolina laws enacted during .1749-1773, for debtors worth less than £2; 1773-1774 &
1777-1778, for all debtors); id. at 92-93 (discussing Rhode Island laws enacted in the
year 1756, relieving all debtors insolvent as of June 1, 1756; 1771-1772, a general law
repealed nine months later); id. at 181-82 (discussing South Carolina laws enacted
during 1721-1744) (discharging debts of debtors owing more than £2 but having less
than £5 of property or annual income).
A few jurisdictions allowed some form of relief in exchange for service. See,
e.g., An Act for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors, within this Government, ch. 76, 1740
Del. Laws, § 11, amended by ch. 118, 1751 Del. Laws (indentured servitude up to
seven years for various groups; debtor discharged from debt if the creditors refused
service); An Act for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors, 1771 N.J. Laws, in 5 Laws of
New Jersey, supra note 92, at 8.1, 86 (requiring up to seven years of service by certain
debtors to obtain discharge) (expired 1776; revived 1783; repealed 1787). See also
Coleman, supra note 59, at 78-79 (discussing Connecticut laws enacted during 17631764); id. at 208-1.0 (discussing Delaware laws enacted during 1734-1915, indentured
servitude up to seven years for various groups; debtor discharged from debt if the
creditors refused service); id. at 164-65 (discussing Maryland laws enacted during
1725-1727, 1733); id. at 40-42 (discussing Massachusetts laws enacted during 16981737); id. at 133 (discussing New Jersey laws enacted in the year 1761); id. at 107
(discussing New York laws enacted in the year 1732); id. at 141-42, 144 (discussing
Pennsylvania laws enacted during 1706-1767, various groups of debtors indentured up
to five or seven years).
94. See An Act Respecting Insolvent Debtors, ch. 34, Apr. Sess., 1787 Md. Laws.
95. See id. §§ 1, 16.
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to creditors;9 6 full discharge of debts without creditor consent; 97 and
even a rudimentary avoidance of preferences.9" In contrast,
Pennsylvania enacted a statute in 1785 that was a composite of the
English Bankrupt Acts.99
Another form of relief in some jurisdictions consisted of private acts
passed by the legislature as the result of petitions of specific
individuals. Usually, these acts released debtors from prison upon
surrender of their property. 100 Some also discharged individual
debtors from their debts.""1 A few provided individualized relief, such
as a moratorium from imprisonment and the imposition on dissenting
minority creditors of a debt adjustment agreement between the debtor
and a majority of the creditors.0 2
96. See id. § 6.
97. See id. §§ 1,3.
98. See id. § 6.
99. See An Act for the Regulation of Bankruptcy, ch. 1183, 1785 Pa. Stat. § 2, in
12 The Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania From 1682 to 1801, at 70 (Clarence M. Bush
St. printer, 1896); see also Plank, Bankruptcy Judges, supra note 64, at 602-06
(presenting a detailed summary of the Pennsylvania Act and comparing the
provisions with those of the English Bankrupt Acts). A few colonies had earlier
enacted shortlived acts that resembled the English Bankrupt Acts. Id. at 602 & n.198.
100. See, e.g., An Act for the Revival and Continuance of an Act Entitled, An Act
for the Relief of Poor Distressed Prisoners for Debt, 1751 N.J. Laws ("sundry
Persons ... by their petition ...praying the Relief of the Legislature"), in 3 Laws of
New Jersey 173; see also Coleman, supra note 59, at 79-83 (discussing Connecticut
laws enacted during 1765-1818); id. at 165-68 (discussing Maryland laws enacted
during 1715-1774); id. at 55-56 (discussing New Hampshire laws enacted during 17451765); id. at 113-15 (discussing New York laws enacted during 1771-1775, 1776-1786);
id. at 145, 147 (discussing Pennsylvania laws enacted during 1731, 1760-1793); id. at
88-89 (discussing Rhode Island laws enacted intermittently); id, at 69-71 (discussing
Vermont laws enacted during 1785-1821).
101. See, e.g., Act of Nov. 24, 1784, ch. 14, 8th Sess., 1784 N.Y. Laws (discharging
debts of several named individuals with consent of creditors with two-thirds of total
debt); An Act Granting Relief to Certain Insolvent Debtors, ch. 87, 8th Sess., 1785
N.Y. Laws (Apr. 28, 1.785) (releasing from prison certain named debtors and
discharging their debts); see also Coleman, supra note 59, at 79-81 (discussing
Connecticut laws enacted during 1765-1818); id. at 165-66 (discussing Maryland laws
enacted during 1715-1723); id. at 92-93, 95-97 (discussing Rhode Island laws enacted
during 1756-1828, petitions granted on the basis of a general law enacted in 1756 that
relieved all debtors insolvent as of June 1, 1756); id. at 145 (discussing Pennsylvania
laws enacted during 1760-1776, one petition); id. at 69-71 (discussing Vermont laws
enacted during 1786-1821).
102. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 59, at 79-81 (discussing Connecticut laws
enacted during 1765-1800, granting a stay from arrest to a debtor who became
insolvent in 1774 because of a loss of his ship and who entered into an agreement with
a majority of creditors allowing the debtor to continue in business for ten years
without arrest after a minority of the creditors refused to agree and threatened
imprisonment, and granting a stay of arrest and full discharge of debts to two
insolvent partners who entered into a composition agreement with a majority of their
creditors to pay fifty percent of their debts in rum if the debtors performed their
agreement); id. at 165-66 (discussing Maryland laws enacted during 1715-1723); id. at
109 (discussing New York laws enacted during 1755, forcing minority creditors to
accept compositions with majority of creditors); id. at 145 (discussing Pennsylvania
laws enacted during 1760-1776, same); id. at 69-71 (discussing Vermont laws enacted
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The English Bankrupt Acts, the English Insolvency Acts, and the
great variety of American legislation represent somewhat different
responses to the problems posed by insolvent debtors unable to pay
their creditors. The Framers of the Constitution were no doubt
familiar with this great variety of legislation. Indeed, one of the
delegates to the constitutional convention, Jared Ingersoll of
Pennsylvania, was an experienced commercial and bankruptcy lawyer
knowledgeable not only about Pennsylvania's act that copied the
English Bankrupt Acts but also with the different American acts,
including Maryland's short-lived full bankruptcy act.""
The technical differences among the three types of bankruptcy
legislation should not obscure the essential elements that all shared.
All of this bankruptcy legislation was directed toward one particular
problem: What is the best form of relief for the creditors and their
debtor when the debtor has insufficient liquid assets to repay her
creditors? This question is the "subject of Bankruptcies."
The bankruptcy legislation of the eighteenth century superceded
the nonbankruptcy individual creditor collection actions, which were
(and still are) wasteful and ineffective against an insolvent debtor. In
place of individual creditor action, all of the eighteenth-century
bankruptcy legislation established a single collective proceeding in
which all creditors could share in a more efficient pro-rata distribution
of the debtor's assets.
Significantly, none of this bankruptcy
legislation attempted to do more than adjust the relationship between
an insolvent debtor and his or her creditors. None attempted to
regulate how debtors and creditors entered into their relationship.
None created the property rights or contract rights underlying the
during 1785-1821).
103. See, e.g., Miller v. Hall, 1 Dal]. 229 (Pa. 1788), discussed supra in note 57 and
accompanying text (discussing how Ingersoll successfully obtained the release from
prison of a Maryland resident arrested in an action by a resident of Pennsylvania on a
debt contracted in Pennsylvania but discharged under Maryland's shortlived general
insolvency law, discussed supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text); Thompson v.
Young, 1 DalI. 294 (Pa. Ct. C.P. of Philadelphia County 1788) (in which Ingersoll
unsuccessfully represented Pennsylvania resident trying to collect on a debt
discharged under Maryland's insolvency act, the court following Miller v. Hall);
Gorgerat v. McCarthy, 1 Dall. 366 (Pa. Ct. C.P. of Philadelphia County 1788) (in
which Ingersoll was unable to obtain the release from prison of a debtor who had
declared himself a bankrupt under the laws of France but who had not yet received a
discharge of debts); Gibbs v. Gibbs, 1 DalI. 371 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Philadelphia County
1788) (priority dispute over bankrupt's property between judgment creditor and
bankruptcy commissioners; Ingersoll represented the bankruptcy commissioner); see
also Robert J. Lukens, Jared Ingersoll's Rejection of Appointment as One of the
"MidnightJudges" of 1801: Foolhardy or Farsighted?,70 Temp. L. Rev. 189, 201-02 &
n.57 (1997) (discussing Mr. Ingersoll's background). Ingersoll also litigated the
validity of an order of relief from imprisonment under a New Jersey relief act. See
Kurt H. Nadelmann, On the Origin of the Bankruptcy Clause, 1 Am. J. Legal Hist.
215, 224-25 (1957).
Ingersoll apparently played a small public role at the
constitutional convention. See Lukens, supra, at 202. To what extent other delegates
consulted with him is not known.

BANKRUPTCY AND FEDERALISM

2002]

1089

debtor-creditor relationship. None affected the rights of debtors or
creditors beyond that which was necessary to adjust their relationship.
None affected the rights of Third Parties other than transferees of the
debtor's property who colluded with the debtor to defraud his or her
creditors.
III. THE PRINCIPLES DEFINING THE "SUBJECT OF BANKRUPTCIES"
Because the word "bankruptcy" was synonymous with "insolvency"
in the eighteenth century, and the eighteenth-century bankruptcy
legislation only adjusted the previously established relationship
between an insolvent debtor and his or her creditors, I conclude that
the "subject of Bankruptcies" in the Bankruptcy Clause is limited to
the adjustment of the relationship between an insolvent debtor and
the debtor's creditors.1"4 To amplify this limitation of the Bankruptcy
Clause, I have derived four guiding principles. Three of these
principles directly govern the extent to which Congress may disregard
or must respect state law. These principles are the Debtor-Creditor
Adjustment Principle, the Non-Expropriation Principle, and the NonInterference Principle.
These principles, described below and
examined in greater detail in part IV, govern the extent of the relief
that bankruptcy law may afford an insolvent debtor. The fourth
principle, the Debtor-Insolvency Principle, does not directly govern
the extent to which Congress may disregard state law. Nevertheless,
this principle, which I also describe below, is a precondition to
Congress's ability to alter the state law entitlements under the
Bankruptcy Power.
A.

The Debtor-CreditorAdjustment Principle

Bankruptcy law may provide that any right or privilege that the
debtor could use-whether the debtor wants to or not-to satisfy her
debts outside of bankruptcy may be used in bankruptcy to satisfy
those debts. Bankruptcy law may appropriate these rights and

104. Although the actual scope of bankruptcy laws enacted by Congress has
expanded, none of the expansions blessed by the Supreme Court and other federal
courts, including the addition of reorganization instead of liquidation, has (with a few
minor exceptions) exceeded the scope of the Bankruptcy Clause. See Plank,
Constitutional Limits, supra note 53, at 534-44. The exceptions are described infra
notes 141-52 and accompanying text. In addition, in 1968, Congress relied on both the
Commerce Clause and the Bankruptcy Clause in enacting two titles of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act directed at the general debtor-creditor relationship, one
making loan sharking a federal crime, see Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, §
202, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-896 (2000)), and the
other imposing a federal limit on the amount of an employee's wages that a creditor
can garnish. Id. §§ 301-307 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677 (2000)). I describe and
criticize this impermissible use of the Bankruptcy Clause in Plank, Constitutional
Limits, supra note 53, at 556-59.
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privileges even if creditors under state law could not directly reach
such rights or privileges." 5
Bankruptcy law may also provide that any liability of the debtor, no
matter how remote or contingent, that exists before or during a
bankruptcy case may be the subject of the bankruptcy case.
Congress's discretion under the Bankruptcy Clause over such
liabilities is complete. It may reduce, subordinate, or discharge any
prebankruptcy liabilities that the debtor owes to creditors. It may
delay, modify, or eliminate any remedies of creditors against the
debtor for such liabilities under state law. For example, putting aside
other constraints imposed by the Constitution," 6 the Bankruptcy

105. Hence, even if creditors could not cause real property to be seized and sold
outside of bankruptcy to satisfy debts, the debtor herself could do so. Accordingly,
bankruptcy law may administer such exempt property for the benefit of creditors, and
historically did so. See supra note 75 & 80 and accompanying text.
106. I believe that the complete abolition of security interests would violate the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. V (stating "nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation"). Although
several commentators have argued that a congressional abolition of prospective
security interests would not violate the Fifth Amendment, these authors analyze the
interests of the secured creditor. See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, Postpetition Interest
Under the Bankruptcy Code, 43 U. Miami L. Rev. 577, 585 (1989) (stating that
Congress can prospectively ban security interests by essentially preventing their
recognition as property that a secured party may hold, and also stating that a
retroactive denial of adequate protection of the secured creditor's interest would not
be unconstitutional); James S. Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors' Rights in
Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the
Bankruptcy Clause, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 973, 987 (1983). But see Julia Patterson
Forrester, Bankruptcy Takings, 51 U. Fla. L. Rev. 851 (1999) (disagreeing with
Rogers).
Nevertheless, the authors supporting the prospective abrogation of security
interests have not analyzed the effect of such abolition on the property interests of the
owner of the property. Eliminating the ability of an owner of property to grant a
security interest would be a sufficiently severe limitation on the use of the owner's
property as to constitute a "regulatory taking" in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
122 S. Ct. 1465, 1479-1481 (2002) (analyzing the difference between a physical taking
and a regulatory taking in a case involving temporary moratoria on development of
land and noting that in "deciding whether a particular governmental action has
effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on
the nature and extent of the interference with" the property interest (quoting Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,130-31 (1978))). For example, as
of March 31, 2002, there was approximately $5.81 trillion of single family mortgage
loans outstanding. See Bd. of Gov. of Fed. Res. System, Domestic Financial Statistics,
88 Fed. Res. Bull. 8, A33, tbl. 1.54, line 2 (Aug. 2002). It is very unlikely that most of
the homeowners who borrowed this amount could afford to buy single family homes
if they could not grant a security interest in the homes to obtain financing to purchase
the home. They would either have to borrow at a higher unsecured rate or not be
able to obtain financing at all. See also Forrester, supra, at 891-94 (stating that the
abrogation of security interests would be a taking of an owner's substantial property
interest as well as a taking of secured creditor's substantial property interest). Lesser
restrictions on security interests, such as those currently imposed by the Bankruptcy
Code, would most likely not rise to the level of a regulatory taking.
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Clause does empower Congress to abolish security interests granted
by the debtor to secure the creditor's debts.
B.

The Non-ExpropriationPrinciple

The Non-Expropriation Principle limits the Debtor-Creditor
Adjustment Principle. Subject to the Non-Interference Principle
discussed below, bankruptcy law may not go beyond the DebtorCreditor Adjustment Principle. It may not expand the rights of
debtors or their creditors beyond that necessary to adjust their
relationship, and it may not otherwise adversely affect the rights or
legal relations of Third Parties, that is, persons who are neither the
debtor nor the creditors of the debtor.
Hence, bankruptcy law may not create rights or property interests
for insolvent debtors or their creditors (other than rights arising
between them under the Debtor-Creditor Adjustment Principle) that
do not exist under state law or federal nonbankruptcy law.
Bankruptcy law may not appropriate property interests of Third
Parties for distribution to creditors. In addition, to the extent that a
debtor has an interest in property items or privileges that contain
inherent limitations that inure to the benefit of a Third Party,
bankruptcy law may not disregard those limitations. °7 Thus, if state
law requires the satisfaction of conditions other than the repayment of
a debt, such as the approval of a private organization or governmental
entity, then the trustee must satisfy such conditions, again, subject to
the Non-Interference Principle discussed below."' 8 Moreover,
bankruptcy law may not alter the substantive legal relationship
between a debtor and the other party to an executory contract or a
lease to the extent that the relationship is not a debtor-creditor
relationship.
Furthermore, just as bankruptcy law may not expropriate property
interests of Third Parties to benefit the debtor or its creditors, it may
not appropriate property interests of the debtor to create a liability
that does not exist under state law nor expand an existing liability.
For example, if state law does not recognize the liability of the debtor
107. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 541(d) (2000) (providing that property in which the
debtor holds only legal title and not an equitable interest becomes property of the
estate only to the extent of the debtor's legal title to such property, but not to the
extent of any equitable interest in such property that the debtor does not hold).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Professional Sales Corp. (In re Professional Sales
Corp.), 56 B.R. 753, 764 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (holding that, even if an interim status
authorization from the EPA to operate a hazardous waste site were property of the
estate, the interim status was encumbered with statutory conditions that were an
incident of any property right that the debtor enjoyed and therefore reversed a
bankruptcy court injunction against termination of the interim status under 11 U.S.C.
§ 105 (2000), stating that the bankruptcy court's order limiting the EPA "expands [the
debtor's] property rights beyond what they would be outside Chapter 11," an
expansion that § 105 did not allow").
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for a particular act, bankruptcy law may not create a liability for the
act. If a creditor is entitled to repayment of principal and 10%

interest on the unpaid balance, bankruptcy law may not give the
creditor principal plus 12% interest on the outstanding balance. °9
Nor may it appropriate property interests of the debtor or the
creditors for the benefit of Third Parties.
Finally, the prohibition on affecting the legal relations of Third
Parties goes beyond property interests and contractual relations.
Hence, no matter how much a divorce may give an individual debtor a
"fresh start," bankruptcy law may not grant a divorce to the debtor, as
Alfred Hill remarked in 1953.110 Bankruptcy law may not prevent
prosecution of a debtor for committing a crime.. or prevent
governmental
entities from enforcing their police powers against a
2
debtor."

C.

The Non-Interference Principle

The Non-Interference
Principle
complements
the NonExpropriation Principle. Bankruptcy law may prevent creditors and
Third Parties from interfering with the bankruptcy process.
Accordingly, although bankruptcy law may not expropriate the rights
of Third Parties to benefit the debtor and its creditors, bankruptcy law
may invalidate efforts by Third Parties to prevent a debtor or creditor
from initiating a bankruptcy case or otherwise obtaining the benefits
of bankruptcy law.113
109. See infra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
110. See Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1013, 103738 (1953).
111. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1) (2000) (providing that the automatic stay does not
apply to the commencement or continuation of a criminal proceeding against the
debtor).
112. See id. § 362(b)(4) (providing that the automatic stay does not apply to the
commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to
enforce the governmental unit's police and regulatory power).
113. The Code implements this aspect of the Non-Interference Principle in several
provisions. See id. § 525(c)(1) (providing that a governmental unit operating a student
grant or loan program or a person that makes loans guaranteed or insured under a
student loan program, each as defined under part B, D, or E of title IV of the Higher
Education Act of 1965 or a similar program operated under State or local law, may
not deny a grant, loan, loan guarantee, or loan insurance to a person that is or has
been a debtor under Bankruptcy Code); id. § 1125(d) (providing that whether a
disclosure statement soliciting approval of a proposed plan required under section
1125(b) contains adequate information is not governed by any otherwise applicable
nonbankruptcy law, rule, or regulation); id. § 1125(e) (providing that a person that
solicits, or participates in, the acceptance or rejection of a plan, in good faith and in
compliance with the applicable provisions of the Code in the offer, issuance, sale, or
purchase of a security, offered or sold under a reorganization the plan is not liable on
account of such solicitation or participation for violation of any applicable law, rule,
or regulation governing solicitation of acceptance or rejection of the offer, issuance,
sale, or purchase of securities); id. § 1142(a) (providing that a reorganization plan
must be implemented notwithstanding any otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law,
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Similarly, the Code may constitutionally prevent a Third Party from
using a debtor's bankruptcy to obtain a benefit that it could not obtain
outside of bankruptcy. Hence, bankruptcy law may invalidate "ipsofacto" provisions that purport to terminate or modify contract rights
and other property interests because of the filing of a bankruptcy
petition.1 14 For example, the Code may prevent a landlord from
terminating a lease that is favorable to the tenant solely because the
tenant filed a bankruptcy petition so long as the tenant is not
otherwise in default under the lease.
In implementing the Non-Interference Principle, federal courts in
bankruptcy, like all courts, may look beyond the formalities of any
legal relationship and analyze the substance of that relationship.
Thus, federal courts may prevent a Third Party from using an
otherwise legitimate provision in state law or an agreement-such as a
right to terminate a contract for any reason-if the Third Party is
exercising that right solely because a debtor filed a bankruptcy
petition. Nevertheless, federal courts in bankruptcy must be sensitive
to the legitimate concerns of Third Parties, and may not sacrifice
those concerns for the benefit of the debtor or its creditors. In some
instances both the Code and its judicial application are
constitutionally suspect.
D. The Debtor-Insolvency Principle
The Debtor-Insolvency Principle requires that a debtor may not be
in bankruptcy unless he, she, or it is insolvent in a broad sense, that is,
the debtor's liabilities exceed its assets, or the debtor is otherwise
unable to pay its debts as they come due."' I conclude that the
rule, or regulation relating to financial condition); id. § 1145 (providing certain
exemption from federal or state securities laws for the offer or sale under a plan of
certain securities in connection with the plan).
Courts also recognize this principle. See, e.g., Hayhoe v. Cole (In re Cole), 226
B.R.647, 651-52 nn.6-7, 654 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998) (holding that prepetition waiver of
discharge was unenforceable against debtor in bankruptcy); In re Tru Block Concrete
Products, Inc., 27 B.R. 486, 492 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1983) (holding void as against public
policy covenant not to file bankruptcy petition in agreement among shareholders of
debtor and creditors to liquidate debtor outside of bankruptcy); see also Marshall E.
Tracht, Contractual Bankruptcy Waivers: Reconciling Theory, Practice, and Law, 82
Cornell L. Rev. 301, 303-15 (1997) (describing and questioning the conventional
wisdom of unenforceability of bankruptcy waivers); David S. Kupetz, The Bankruptcy
Code is Part of Every Contract: Minimizing the Impact of Chapter 11 on the NonDebtor's Bargain,54 Bus. Law. 55, 67-69 (1998) (summarizing law on pre-bankruptcy
waivers).
114. 1 describe the Code's invalidation of these "ipso-facto" provisions and their
close cousins, anti-assignment provisions that purport to prevent the bankruptcy
trustee from obtaining the property interests of the debtor, in greater detail in Part
IV, infra.
115. Insolvency is either balance sheet insolvency-the debtor's liabilities exceed
assets-or cash flow insolvency-the debtor is generally unable to pay debts as they
become due. The latter typically arises when the debtor has illiquid assets that cannot
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"subject of Bankruptcies" includes the Debtor-Insolvency Principle
for two reasons. First, as discussed above, the word "bankruptcy" was
synonymous with the word "insolvency" when the Bankruptcy Clause
was written and the Constitution adopted. The word means the
condition of being unable to repay one's debts." 6
Second, although "insolvency" was not always a direct condition to
relief under the three groups of eighteenth-century bankruptcy
legislation, almost all of that legislation had jurisdictional
requirements that represent more particular examples of insolvency.
For example, the English Bankrupt Acts and the 1785 Pennsylvania
Bankruptcy Act required that a merchant have committed one or
more "acts of bankruptcy." These acts consisted either of deliberate
acts by which the debtor attempted to avoid the repayment of his or
her debts or the condition of being unable to repay his or her debts,
such as remaining in prison for more than two months for the nonpayment of debts.1' 7 Similarly, the English Insolvency Acts and most
be quickly converted into cash, but insufficient liquid assets, such as cash, to pay
current debts. The Code uses both concepts. For most debtors, the term "insolvent"
in the Code means balance sheet insolvency. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(A), (B) (2000). For
municipalities filing for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 9 of the Code, "insolvent"
defines a form of cash flow insolvency: "generally not paying its debts as they become
due unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute or ... unable to pay its
debts as they become due." Id. § 101(32)(C). Cash flow insolvency also appears in id.
§ 303(h)(1) (providing that the court shall order relief against the debtor in an
involuntary case only if the debtor is generally not paying such debtor's debts as such
debts become due unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute).
116. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
117. The early definitions of the "acts of bankruptcy" in the English Bankrupt Acts
focused on the deliberate acts to avoid repayment of debts. Later additions to the
definition, however, reflected the condition of insolvency. Hence, under the 1542
Statute of 34 & 35 Henry VIII, the acts of bankruptcy were "flee[ing] to Parts
unknown, or keep[ing] their Houses." 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 4, § 1 (1542-1543) (Eng.).
The 1570 Statute of 13 Elizabeth made the acts of bankruptcy more specific,
consisting of the following:
[I]f... any such person ... depart the realm; or begin to keep his or her
House or Houses, or otherwise to absent him or herself; or take Sanctuary;
or suffer him or herself willingly to be arrested for any Debt or other Thing,
not grown or due for Money delivered, Ware sold, or any other just or lawful
Cause, or good Consideration or Purposes,... suffer him or herself to be
outlawed, or yield him or herself to Prison, or depart from his or her
Dwellinghouse or Houses, to the Intent or Purpose to defraud or hinder any
of his or her Creditors,... of the just Debt or Duty of such Creditor or
Creditors ....
13 Eliz., c. 7, § 1 (1570) (Eng.) (clause numbering omitted). See generally Treiman,
supra note 60, at 193-95.
In 1604, the Statute of 1 James expanded the acts of bankruptcy set forth in
the Statute of 13 Elizabeth. It added (i) willfully or fraudulently procuring the
bankrupt's arrest or the attachment or sequestration of the bankrupt's goods and (ii)
making a fraudulent grant or conveyance of property, both with the intent of
defrauding creditors, and (iii) continuing to lie in prison for six months after being
imprisoned for debt, which need not be done with the intent of defrauding or
hindering creditors. 1 Jam., c. 15, § 2, cls. (5), (7), (9) (1604) (Eng.); see Treiman,
supra note 60, at 196.
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of the American bankruptcy legislation required that the debtor be in
prison for the non-payment of debts.118
The Debtor-Insolvency Principle is a precondition to Congress's
power under the Bankruptcy Clause to override state law entitlements
of creditors. The purpose of the permissible bankruptcy rules that
alter the state rights of the debtor or creditor is specifically to solve
the basic social problem of an insolvent debtor who cannot repay her
creditors. The Debtor-Insolvency Principle prevents debtors and
creditors from taking advantage of these rules, which are not available
under nonbankruptcy law, to alter the rights of debtors and their
creditors when the debtors can repay their creditors. 119
IV. THE CODE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION: COMPLIANCE AND
DEFIANCE

The Code reflects the three principles discussed above that directly
govern the extent to which Congress may alter the state law rights of
debtors and creditors. 2 ' As I discuss in Parts IV. A and B below, it
The 1623 Statute of 21 James added several new acts of bankruptcy. These
included petitioning the King or the courts to compel any creditor to accept less than
full payment of the creditor's debt or for an extension of time to pay a debt; lying in
prison for more than two months after being arrested for nonpayment of a debt; or
escaping from prison after being arrested for a debt of £100 or more. 21 Jam., c. 19, §
2, cls. (5), (7), (8) (1623) (Eng.). These provisions remained a feature of bankruptcy
law through the eighteenth century. See William Cooke, A Compendious System of
The Bankrupt Laws 86-89 (Dublin, 1786).
Other provisions included failing to pay a debt of £100 or more within six
months after it was due and being arrested for the debt, and obtaining release
["enlargement"] from prison by obtaining bail. 21 Jam., c. 19, § 2, cls. (6), (8). These
acts of bankruptcy were repealed in 1711. 10 Ann., c. 15, § 1 (1711) (Eng.).
The 1785 Pennsylvania Bankruptcy Act essentially copied all of the "acts of
bankruptcy" of the English Bankrupt Acts. See An Act for the Regulation of
Bankruptcy, c. 1183, 1785 Pa. Stat. § 1, in 12 The Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania
From 1682 to 1801, at 70 (Clarence M. Bush, St. printer, 1896).
118. See supra notes 79-80 & 91 and accompanying text.
119. See also Plank, Constitutional Limits, supra note 53, at 545-56 (explaining the
extent to which courts refuse to permit solvent debtors from abusing the bankruptcy
process to obtain a benefit that they could not obtain outside of bankruptcy); Plank,
Bankruptcy Judges, supra note 64, at 629-36 (arguing that bankruptcy judges need not
be appointed for life under Article III of the U.S. Constitution so long as their
activities are limited to the permissible scope of bankruptcy law, the adjustment of the
insolvent debtor-creditor relationship).
120. The article addresses the relationship between bankruptcy law and state law.
As noted above, the Bankruptcy Code also refers specifically to federal law. See
supra note 30. More generally, the Bankruptcy Code refers to nonbankruptcy law,
which includes federal nonbankruptcy law. See, e.g., Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S.
753, 757-60 (1992). In this case, the Court held that the anti-alienation requirements
of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2000)
(requiring qualified pension plans to provide that benefits may not be assigned or
alienated), was applicable nonbankruptcy law for purposes of section 541(c)(2), which
provides that a restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a
trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a
bankruptcy case under this title. Id. at 765-66. In doing so, the Court rejected those
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has broadly defined the property interests of the debtor that may be
used to repay creditors, and it has broadly defined the creditors who

may share in those property interests. In doing so, it has generally
respected the Non-Expropriation Principle while implementing the

Non-Interference Principle. In a few instances, however, the Code
authorizes the expropriation of the property interests of Third Parties
for the benefit of debtors and their creditors.
The case of executory contracts and leases presents a more

complicated picture of the interrelationship of the three principles.
There are two reasons for this complexity. First, each executory
contract or lease represents both a contingent asset and a contingent
liability. Second, the other party to the executory contract or lease
may have rights both as a Third Party (generally, with regard to future
activities) and as a creditor holding a pre-petition claim. I address this
interrelationship below in Part IV. C. Finally, Part IV. D analyzes
how the abolition of "ipso-facto" provisions is consistent with the
three principles.
A.

The PropertyAvailable to Creditors

1. Broad Inclusion of the Debtor's Property
The Code implements the Debtor-Creditor Adjustment Principle to
a substantial degree by broadly defining the property of the estate to

federal court decisions that held that the exclusion of 541(b)(2) applied only to valid
spendthrift trusts under state law. Id. at 760-61.
In other cases, the Code may not specifically refer to federal law or
nonbankruptcy law but the application of the Code nevertheless requires reconciling
a conflict between bankruptcy law and federal nonbankruptcy law. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984). In this case, the Court reconciled a conflict
between the Code and the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2000),
see Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 523, and held that (1) section 365 of the Code authorized the
debtor in possession to reject a labor agreement without complying with the
procedural requirements of the National Labor Relations Act, see id. at 526-27
(noting, however, that the bankruptcy court should take into account the policies of
the NLRA and not approve rejection unless persuaded that reasonable efforts to
negotiate a voluntary solution were made but those negotiations were not likely to
produce a prompt settlement) and (2) the debtor's failure to comply with the
collective bargaining agreement during the bankruptcy case was not an unfair labor
practice under the NLRA. See id. at 531-34.
Although the Court treated this as a matter of statutory interpretation
requiring reconciliation of different provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and the
NLRA, this statutory conflict contains a constitutional element. To the extent that
any federal law creates rights in favor of Third Parties, the Bankruptcy Code may not
violate the Non-Expropriation Principle and abrogate those rights. Of course, a
federal court may interpret the federal nonbankruptcy law in a way that
accommodates the Bankruptcy Code or its policies. The constitutional dimension still
exists, but the fact that both the bankruptcy law and federal nonbankruptcy law
emanate from the same sovereign governments eases the task of reconciling any
conflict between the two bodies of law.
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include "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property" as of
the filing of the petition. 121 The Code then authorizes the trustee to
use, sell, or lease property of the estate 122 and to sell property
in which
123
the estate has an interest under specified circumstances.
The Code could go further. First, the Code could define property
of the estate in all cases to include some or all of the income of an
individual debtor earned after the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 2 4
Some authorities1 25 have expressed a concern that the mandatory
inclusion of the postpetition income of an individual debtor in the
property of the estate 126 would violate the Thirteenth Amendment's
prohibition against involuntary servitude. 27 I would disagree with this
view. There is no constitutional right to have a discharge in
bankruptcy. 128 Without a discharge, the debtor's income remains
121. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2000), quoted supra note 36.
122. See id. § 363(b), (c).
123. See id. § 363(f).
124. The Code excludes this income because (a) this income is not an interest in
property as of the commencement of the estate and (b) to the extent that this income
could be seen as the proceeds of a contract that was property of the estate, it is
expressly excluded under section 541(a)(1). See generally Louis M. Phillips & Tanya
Martinez Shively, Ruminations on Property of the Estate-DoesAnyone Know Why a
Debtor's Postpetition Earnings, Generated by Her Own Earning Capacity, Are Not
Property of the Bankruptcy Estate?, 58 La. L. Rev. 623 (1998).
125. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 120 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6080-81; Karen Gross, The Debtor as Modern Day Peon: A Problem of
UnconstitutionalConditions, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 165, 167-68 (1990); see also In re
Fluharty, 23. B.R. 426, 428 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982) (holding that a creditor could not
move for modification of a Chapter 13 plan, and stating that a debtor may not be
required to file a Chapter 13 petition, "as it has been suggested that this may be in
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition against involuntary servitude").
But see Steven L. Harris, A Reply to Theodore Eisenberg's Bankruptcy Law in
Perspective, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 327, 348-49 (1982) (suggesting that the non-mandatory
nature of Chapter 13 reflects a policy preference and not a strong conviction that a
mandatory Chapter 13 would violate the Thirteenth Amendment). See also Theodore
Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 953, 988 (1981) (arguing
that requiring debtors to repay debts would not violate the Thirteenth Amendment);
Kenneth N. Klee, Restructuring Individual Debts, 71 Am. Bankr. L.J. 431, 447-49
(1997) (same).
126. The Code includes in property of the estate the postpetition income of debtors
who file a petition for relief under Chapter 13. See 11 U.S.C. § 1306 (2000) (including
in property of the estate (1) all property specified in section 541 that the debtor
acquires during the case, and (2) earnings from services performed by the debtor
during the case). Chapter 13 cases, however, can only be initiated by the debtor and
not by creditors. See id. § 1321.
127. See U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1 ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.").
128. See, e.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446-47 (1973) (holding that
there was no constitutional right to a bankruptcy discharge and therefore an
individual had no right to waiver of bankruptcy filing fees); In re Krohn, 886 F.2d 123,
127 (6' h Cir. 1989) (affirming the dismissal of an individual's Chapter 7 petition for
substantial abuse); In re Herberman, 122 B.R. 273, 283-85 (Bankr. W.D. Tex 1990)
(holding that a plan requiring an individual debtor in Chapter 11 to receive only 75%
portion of the individual's gross billing revenues (less expenses) did not violate the
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subject to the claims of creditors. Hence, requiring a debtor to devote
postpetition income to the repayment of creditors does not put the
debtor in a worse position than he or she would be without a
discharge. Nevertheless, there may be good policy reasons for not
including an individual debtor's postpetition income. This issue arises
in the recent debate over the extent to which an individual's right to
obtain a discharge should be "means tested," that is, limited to those
individuals who do not have sufficient postpetition income to repay
their debts. 2 9
In addition, Congress need not limit the powers of the trustee to
"interests in property." Any privilege or right that a debtor could use
for the repayment of creditors could be used by the bankruptcy
trustee. For example, the bankruptcy court in In re McCourt30 held
that an individual debtor's statutory right under New York law to
elect to take one-third of his wife's estate in lieu of the amount left
under the wife's will was not property of the estate. This decision, in
my view, is a correct decision.
Nevertheless, Congress could
specifically authorize the trustee to exercise these kinds of privileges
to the same extent that the debtor could. On the other hand, these
circumstances may be sufficiently rare as not to justify the effort of
crafting the necessary language that would not be too broad.
The Code does allow the trustee to recapture property interests that
the debtor transferred before bankruptcy to Third Parties for the
purpose of defrauding its creditors. 3 ' The recapture of property
interests transferred to Third Parties who colluded with the debtor to
defraud the debtor's creditors does not violate the Non-Expropriation
Principle if those Third Parties do not acquire a legitimate property
Thirteenth Amendment).
129. See generally Skeel, supra note 11, at 154, 194-96, 204-05; Jean Braucher,
Means Testing Consumer Bankruptcy: The Problem of Means, 7 Fordham J. Corp. L.
407 (2002) (arguing that the proposed 2002 consumer bankruptcy legislation adopting
a complicated means testing procedure would impose greater burdens on the
innocent, but unfortunate, individual debtor without any significant reduction in the
few abusers of the current bankruptcy process or increase of collections in
bankruptcy); Jean Braucher, Increasing Uniformity in Consumer Bankruptcy: Means
Testing as a Distractionand the National Bankruptcy Review Commission's Proposals
as a Starting Point, 6 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 1 (1998) (criticizing means testing in
several bills introduced in Congress in 1998); Melissa B. Jacoby, Collecting Debtsfrom
the Ill and Injured: The Rhetorical Significance, But Practical Irrelevance, of
Culpability and Ability to Pay, 51 Am. U. L. Rev. 229, 253-62 (2001); Ted Janger,
Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence and Statutory Design, 43
Ariz. L. Rev. 559, 615-20 (2001) (explaining why the then pending proposals for
means testing create "a rule that is likely to accomplish virtually none of the stated
goals of its drafters"); Zachary Price, The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act, 39 Harv. J. Legis. 237 (2002) (criticizing the version of the
bankruptcy reform pending in the 107th Congress); Charles Jordan Tabb, The Death
of Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States?, 18 Bankr. Dev. J. 1 (2001) (discussing
recent trends in consumer bankruptcy laws).
130. 12 B.R. 587 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
131. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2000).
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interest or if under state law a creditor could avoid the transfer.
Similarly, the Code allows the trustee to recapture property interests
that the debtor transferred before bankruptcy to preferred creditors
on the eve of bankruptcy.3 2 The ability to avoid preferential transfers
does not violate the Non-Expropriation Principle because this
avoidance power simply recaptures property that would, without such
preferential transfer, be available to all creditors. Moreover, the
avoidance of preferential transfers is also justified under the NonInterference Principle.
The avoidance of preferences prevents
creditors who get the first hint of the insolvency of the debtor from
avoiding the mandatory collective action of a bankruptcy by obtaining
payment on the eve of a filing.
In addition, the trustee under the strong arm power may avoid the
unperfected transfer of a property interest to Third Parties if a lien
creditor could take priority over the transferee.133 This power falls
within the Bankruptcy Clause because, absent a bankruptcy filing, a
lien creditor retains the power to levy on that property interest for
payment of its debt.'34
Similarly, the trustee may avoid the
unperfected transfer of real property to a Third Party if a bona fide
purchaser for value could take priority over the transferee.135
Allowing the trustee to recapture this real property interest does not
violate the nonbankruptcy rights of the prior unperfected transferee
because outside of bankruptcy, notwithstanding the prior unperfected
transfer, the debtor retains the power to sell that real property to a
bona fide purchaser. 36
By defining the estate as "all of the legal or equitable interests of
the debtor in property," the Code necessarily requires that any
conditions or limitations inherent in those property interests must be
respected. 3 Under the Non-Expropriation Principle, the Code must
do so. For example, assume that 0 had conveyed Blackacre to D in
fee simple determinable so long as D does not serve liquor on the
premises and upon D serving liquor on the premises, Blackacre
automatically reverts to 0. If D files a bankruptcy petition, the estate
remains subject to the limitation that the fee simple will terminate if
132. See id. § 547.
133. See id. § 544(a)(1).
134. See U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2) (2001).
135. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) (2000).
136. See, e.g., William B. Stoebuck & Dale A. Whitman, Law of Property § 11.9, at
871-72 (3d ed. 2000) (describing how the recording system may give priority over a
later transferee if the first transferee fails to record the instrument of transfer).
137. See, e.g., Thomas E. Plank, The Outer Boundaries of the Bankruptcy Estate,47
Emory L.J. 1193, 1219-34, 1254-62 (1998) [hereinafter Plank Bankruptcy Estate]
(explaining that Congress intentionally defined property of the estate to contain only
those specific rights in a property item that a debtor had and how Citizens Bank of
Maryland v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 21 (1995), endorsed this explicit definition of
property of the estate to exclude from property of the estate the rights that an entity
other than the estate has in the property item).
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the trustee serves liquor on the premises. Even though Blackacre may
become more valuable without the ban on serving liquor, both the
express definition of property of the estate and the NonExpropriation Principle prevent the bankruptcy trustee from freeing
Blackacre of the limitation.
The only exceptions to the requirement to respect conditions and
limitations inherent in the debtor's property interests are those that
fall within the Non-Interference Principle. Hence, as discussed in Part
IV.D below, the Code abrogates certain "ipso-facto" provisions that
purport to modify or terminate the debtor's rights if the debtor files
for bankruptcy.
Further, the Code properly disregards antiassignment provisions that purport to prevent property interests of the
debtor from becoming property of the estate. 3 s This abrogation of
state law rights is fully within the Non-Interference Principle. To the
extent that the debtor has an interest in property, the trustee for the
debtor should be able to succeed to those interests even if state law or
an anti-assignment provision enforceable under state law would
prevent a transfer of those interests to another person.
Whether the trustee can later sell a property interest without regard
to the state law limitations on assignment is a different question. To
the extent that the anti-assignment provisions are part of an interest of
a Third Party, other sections of the Code generally protect 3 9 the state
law rights of the Third Party. In a few instances, such as disregarding
a spouse's interests as a tenant by the entireties, the Code violates the
Non-Expropriation Principle by overruling the state law rights of one
spouse who is a tenant by the entirety to prevent alienation of the
other spouse's interest in the tenancy by the entirety. 411 The Code
also abrogates anti-assignment provisions in the case of the
assumption and assignment of executory interests and leases, and as
discussed below in Part IV.C, the Code in some instances authorizes a
violation of the Non-Expropriation Principle.
2. Constitutional Violations: Expansion of the Estate by
Expropriation
In a few sections, the Code violates the Non-Expropriation
Principle by expropriating the property interests of Third Parties for
the benefit of creditors. The most significant violations occur in
section 363(h). Section 363(h) is, in essence, a federal "partition by
sale" statute that applies only in bankruptcy. It permits a bankruptcy
court to sell a property item in which the estate has an interest and a
138. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(A) (2000).
139. See id. § 363(f) (providing that the "trustee may sell property under subsection

(b) or (c) of this section free and clear of any interest in such property of an entity
other than the estate, only if" the conditions of that subsection are satisfied).
140. See infra note 141 and accompanying text (describing the abrogation of the
rights of a tenant by the entirety).
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Third Party has an interest as a co-tenant if certain conditions are
satisfied. 4 1 These conditions displace state law.
Under state law, a co-tenant has a right to partition a jointly owned
property item, such as a parcel of land.4 This partition may be a
partition in kind-a physical division of the property item-or a

partition by sale-a judicial sale of the property item and the division
of the proceeds of sale. 143 The parties, however, may agree that the

property item may not be partitioned, and state law generally will
honor the agreement if the restriction is limited to a reasonable time
or if the 44agreement is necessary to carry out the purpose of the co1

tenancy.

The conditions set forth in section 363(h) of the Code do not take
into account the enforceability of agreements not to partition. The
key conditions of section 363(h) are that (i) sale of the estate's
undivided interest in the property item would realize significantly less
141. Section 363(h) provides:
Notwithstanding subsection (f) of this section, the trustee may sell both the
estate's interest, under subsection (b) or (c) of this section, and the interest
of any co-owner in property in which the debtor had, at the time of the
commencement of the case, an undivided interest as a tenant in common,
joint tenant, or tenant by the entirety, only if(1) partition in kind of such property among the estate and such co-owners is
impracticable;
(2) sale of the estate's undivided interest in such property would realize
significantly less for the estate than sale of such property free of the interests
of such co-owners;
(3) the benefit to the estate of a sale of such property free of the interests of
co-owners outweighs the detriment, if any, to such co-owners; and
(4) such property is not used in the production, transmission, or distribution,
for sale, of electric energy or of natural or synthetic gas for heat, light, or
power.
See 11 U.S.C. § 363(h) (2000).
142. See, e.g., Stoebuck & Whitman, supra note 136, § 5.11, at 215-16 (discussing
the availability of judicial partition); see also 7 Powell on Real Property § 50.07[3][a],
at 50-40 (Richard R. Powell & Michael Alan Wolf eds., 2002) ("Each tenant in
common has the right to compel partition of the estate under judicial supervision.")
143. See 7 Powell on Real Property, supra note 142, § 50.0317][c], at 50-42 & n. 29;
Stoebuck & Whitman, supra note 136, § 5.13, at 221-24.
144. See Stoebuck & Whitman, supra note 136, § 5.11, at 216-17; Wade R. Habeeb,
Annotation, Contractual Provisions as Affecting Right to Judicial Partition, 37
A.L.R.3d 962, 967-73 (1971). In addition, courts have implied a waiver of partition
when partition would frustrate the initial purpose of the co-tenants. Id. at 976. The
waiver of partition, however, may only extend for a reasonable time, and an
agreement never to partition property would not be enforceable. Id.; see also Duffy
v. Duffy, 81 Pa. D. & C. 366, 372 (1951) (denying partition of a home purchased in
1942 by a brother and two sisters as joint tenants to serve as a family home because of
an oral agreement among the siblings that the property not be partitioned until there
were only one survivor); Coleman v. Coleman, 19 Pa. 100, 107 (1852) (upholding an
agreement among co-tenants made in 1787 not to partition property containing iron
ore because the purpose of the agreement was still being served; the court noted that
"[I]f the ore should fail (a contingency which at that day may have been deemed
probable), or the manufacture of iron on the estate should cease, the agreement
would have accomplished its mission, and the hills might then be parted").
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for the estate than sale of the property item free of the interests of the
co-owners, and (ii) the benefit to the estate of a sale of the property
item free of the145 interests of co-owners outweighs any detriment to
such co-owners.
The test that balances the benefits to the estate against the
detriments of the Third Party violates the Non-Expropriation
Principle. This federal balancing test replaces the protections that
state law provides to co-tenants. A bankruptcy trustee need only
resort to section 363(h) if she cannot force the sale of the property
item under section 363(f). Section 363(f)(1) specifically authorizes the
bankruptcy trustee to sell a property item free of any interest of any
46
other person if applicable nonbankruptcy law permitted such a sale.
Because state law already allows for a partition sale, a bankruptcy
trustee need only resort to section 363(h) if the co-tenants had entered
into an agreement not to partition the property item enforceable
under state law. Accordingly, the Code allows the trustee to override
the interests of the Third Party co-tenant if the benefit to the estate is
greater than the detriment to the co-tenant.
This is not a trivial matter. Every co-tenant has the right to use the
jointly owned property item. The ability of a bankruptcy trustee under
section 363(h) to force a partition sale notwithstanding an agreement
of the co-tenants inhibits the ability of one co-tenant to develop the
jointly owned property item and to obtain financing for such
development. Any person, including a creditor, potential tenants, and
interested government agencies, dealing with the co-tenant who
proposes to develop the property item must take into account the
possibility that the co-tenant will become a debtor under the Code.
The evaluation of this risk is a normal part of any development
project. Under section 363(h), however, that person must also take
into account the possibility that one of the other co-tenants will also
become a debtor under the Code. If the bankruptcy court orders a
sale of the jointly owned property item, a non-debtor co-tenant does
have the right to buy the entire property item. 147 However, the non145. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(h)(1) (2000), quoted supra note 141. The first condition,
that partition in kind be impracticable, see id., mirrors state law. See, e.g., Stoebuck &
Whitman, supra note 136, § 5.13, at 222-23 (stating that courts have a preference for
partition in kind, but that all states allow partition by sale whenever a fair and
equitable physical division of the property is impossible, and that most partition
actions result in partition by sale); Candace Reid, Note, Partitions in Kind: A
Preference Without Favor, 7 Cardozo L. Rev. 855, 864-72 (1986) (arguing that,
notwithstanding the common statement of the preference for partition in kind, courts
in practice favor partition by sale).
146. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(1) (2000) (providing that the "trustee may sell property
under subsection (b) or (c) of this section free and clear of any interest in such
property of an entity other than the estate, only if (1) applicable nonbankruptcy law
permits sale of such property free and clear of such interest").
147. See id. § 363(i) (providing that before the consummation of a sale of property
under (h), "the co-owner may purchase such property at the price at which such sale
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debtor co-tenant may not have sufficient liquid resources at the time
of the sale to do so. In fact, the co-ownership structure may have been
used precisely because of a lack of sufficient equity funds by the coowner developing the property item.148
Indeed, Congress explicitly recognized the importance of protecting
facilities that produce or distribute electricity and gas from partition
by sale by a bankruptcy court.149 The Non-Expropriation Principle
requires that, to the extent that state law protects a co-tenant of any
property item from a partition by sale, the Code must respect such a
limitation.
Other violations of the Non-Expropriation Principle include the
ability of the trustee to sell property items free of a spouse's interest
as a tenant by the entirety15 and a spouse's rights of dower or
curtesy. 15 Further, the ability of the trustee under the Code to
reclaim a property item fraudulently transferred to a good faith
purchaser in exchange for the value given by that purchaser also
violates the principle because it would deprive the purchaser of the
is to be consummated").
148. For example, if a sole owner of a development project valued at $100 million
obtained an 80% loan for $80 million, the owner would only need to provide $20
million of equity to complete the development. However, if a 90% co-owner of the
project obtained the 80% loan for $80 million (secured by the entire project), the coowner would only need to provide $10 million of equity and the other co-owner
would provide the remaining $10 million.
149. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(h)(4) (2000), quoted supra note 141; Statement of
Representative Edwards, 124 Cong. Rec. H11089, H11093, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6436, 6446:
Section 363(h) of the House amendment adopts a new paragraph (4)
representing a compromise between the House bill and the Senate
amendment. The provision adds a limitation indicating that a trustee or
debtor in possession sell jointly owned property only if the property is not
used in the production, transmission, or distribution for sale, of electric
energy or of natural or synthetic gas for heat, light, or power. This limitation
is intended to protect public utilities from being deprived of power sources
because of the bankruptcy of a joint owner.
150. The conditions for sale set forth in section 363(h) do not adequately protect
the substantial property interests of a tenant by the entireties in about 30 states, which
give a tenant by the entirety a right of survivorship that can be destroyed only by a
divorce or voluntary joint conveyance and that also prevent, in some states, the
complete alienation of one spouse's interests without the consent of the other spouse.
See 7 Powell on Real Property, supra note 142, § 52.01[3], at 52-4 through -12
(surveying the laws in 30 states and the District of Columbia); Stoebuck & Whitman,
supra note 136, § 5.5, at 195-97 (describing the limitations on the individual tenants'
rights); see also Plank, Constitutional Limits, supra note 53, at 571-74 (discussing in
greater detail the affect of the abolition of a spouse's property rights).
151. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(g) (stating that "the trustee may sell property under
subsection (b) or (c) of this section free and clear of any vested or contingent right in
the nature of dower or curtesy"). Curtesy has been abolished in all states, and dower
has been abolished in all but a few states and does not appear to be a significant
property interest in those states. See 2 Powell on Real Property, supra note 142,
§ 15.08, at 15-95 through 15-98; Stoebuck & Whitman, supra note 136, § 2.14, at 69-72.
Hence, the constitutional violation is minor. Nevertheless, it is a violation.
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appreciation in the market value of the property item after the
transfer.'52 Finally, as discussed in Part III.C below, certain of the
provisions of the Code authorizing the assumption and assignment of
executory contracts and leases expropriates the property rights of
Third Parties for the benefit of debtors and their creditors.
B.

The Creditors Who May Share
1.

Defining the Creditor

The initial question in implementing the Debtor-Creditor
Adjustment Principle is the definition of a creditor who may share in
the assets of the debtor. The Code defines a "creditor" as a person
holding a "claim" that "arose" before the order for relief.'53 A claim

is a "right to payment," even if unliquidated, contingent, unmatured,

or disputed.'5 4 The Code does not define either "right to payment" or
"arose." As a threshold constitutional matter, the definition of "right

to payment" or "arose" is a matter of nonbankruptcy law. A "right to
payment" must exist under nonbankruptcy law. The time when it
"arises" must also be determined under nonbankruptcy law.
In most instances, it is not difficult to determine who is a creditor.
A person who signs a note or purchases goods on account incurs an
obligation to pay, and the payee has a right to payment that arose at
the time of the signing of the note or the purchase of the goods.' 55 If

the obligor later files a bankruptcy petition, the payee becomes a
"creditor"

with

a

right

to

case.'56

payment

that

arose

before

the

commencement of the
Similarly, if a person injures another in
an automobile accident and then files a bankruptcy petition, the
152. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 548 (a)(1)(B)(c) (providing that, if a debtor conveys property
with actual intent to defraud creditors, and the transferee does not know of or
participate in the fraud, the Code allows the trustee to the avoid the transfer and
simply return the original consideration). The trustee would only avoid such a
transfer if the property item had appreciated in value between the time of purchase,
which could have been up to one year before the filing of the petition, see id. §
548(a)(1), and the time the trustee initiates a fraudulent conveyance avoidance action,
which could be up to three years, after the filing of the petition, see id. § 546(a).
In the case of a constructively fraudulent transfer, which requires that a
transferee takes property for less than reasonably equivalent value, avoided under §
548(a)(1)(B), the transferee is or should be on notice that she received less than
reasonably equivalent value and therefore is not entitled to any appreciation in the
value of the property.
153. See id. § 101(10), quoted supra note 44.
154. See id. § 101(5), quoted supra note 45.
155. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-412 (2001) (providing that an issuer of a note is obligated
to pay the note according to its terms at the time of issuance); id. § 9-102(a)(2)
(defining "account" to mean a right to payment of a monetary obligation for various
purposes).
156. See Charles J. Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy § 7.1, at 471, § 7.2, at 472 (1997)
[hereinafter Tabb, Bankruptcy].
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victim will have a cause of action and a right to payment for her
injuries that arose before the bankruptcy petition.'57 Even contingent
obligations, such as a guarantee by one person of the payment of a
debt by another, create a right to payment at the time of the issuance
of the guarantee. If the guarantor becomes a debtor, the payee on the
debt will have a contingent claim against the guarantor and will be a

creditor. 158
The question of when a right to payment arises has troubled many
bankruptcy courts in the case of latent torts, when the injury may not
become manifest until long after the conduct that produced the injury.
Bankruptcy courts have generally used three different tests: the
conduct test, the relationship test, and the state law accrual test. 59
Under the conduct test, the claim of a victim arises at the time of the
conduct that causes injury. Under the relationship test, the claim
arises at the later of the time of the conduct or the time that the victim
and the tortfeasor enter into a relationship. Under the state law
accrual test, the claim arises when the cause of action "accrues" under
various state law tests, most commonly when the victim discovers the
injury and the cause of action begins to accrue for purposes of the
statute of limitations.
An example will illustrate these tests. Assume that, in Year 1,
Manufacturer manufactures an airplane that contains a latent defect
and, without knowledge of the defect, sells the airplane to Pilot. In
Year 3, because of the defect in the airplane, the airplane crashes and
injures both Pilot and Bystander.
Under the conduct test, a claim for liability of either Pilot or
Bystander arises when Manufacturer manufactures and sells the
airplane in Year 1.160 Under the relationship test, the claim of Pilot
arises when Pilot purchases the airplane in Year 1, and the claim of
Bystander arises when Bystander is injured by Manufacturer's
airplane in Year 3 because that is when Bystander has a "relationship"
with the Manufacturer. Finally, under the state law accrual test, in a
state that follows the discovery rule for its statute of limitations, 6 ' the
claims of Pilot and Bystander arise in Year 3 when the airplane

157. See id.§ 7.1, at 469, § 7.2, at 473.
158. See S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 22 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5808; Tabb, Bankruptcy, supra note 156, § 7.2, at 472-73.
159. See, e.g., Epstein v. Official Comm. of Unsec. Cred. of Estate of Piper Aircraft
Corp., 58 F.3d 1573, 1576-77 (11th Cir. 1995); Alan N. Resnick, Bankruptcy as a
Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-ThreateningMass Tort Liability, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev.
2045, 2070-75 (2000) (also identifying a fourth test, the "fair contemplation test" and

advocating the adoption of a modified conduct test). See NBRC Rep., supra note 7,
§ 2.1.1, at 323; Tabb, Bankruptcy, supra note 156, § 7.2, at 473-75.
160. See also U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (2001) (providing that in every sale of a good there
is implied a warranty of merchantability).

161. See Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 218, at 554-57 (2000).

1106

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

crashes, causes injury to Pilot and Bystander, and each therefore
discovers the existence of the defect.
Assume further that, in Year 2, Manufacturer files a bankruptcy
petition, the bankruptcy case is administered, and the bankruptcy
court determines that all of Manufacturer's creditors other than Pilot
and Bystander would receive payment of approximately 50% of the
value of their claims either through a liquidation of Manufacturer's
assets or through confirmation of Manufacturer's plans. Assume
further either that Manufacturer receives a discharge from all
prepetition debts pursuant to a reorganization plan'6 2 or, as an
individual, in a Chapter 7 liquidation,'63 or that Manufacturer as a
64
corporation is liquidated and all its assets are distributed.1
Under the conduct test, both Pilot and Bystander would be
"creditors" whose claim arose before the filing of the petition in Year
2 and would share in the liquidation of Manufacturer's assets or
receive the benefits of Manufacturer's reorganization plan but whose
claims would be discharged (or in the case of a corporate liquidation,
all of whose assets would be distributed). Hence, neither Pilot nor
Bystander could collect their claims from the post-discharge income
or property of Manufacturer.
Under the relationship test, Pilot would be a "creditor" whose claim
arose in Year 1, before the petition, and who would share in the
liquidation of Manufacturer's assets (or receive the benefits of
Manufacturer's reorganization plan) but whose claim would be
discharged. Bystander would not be a "creditor" who would share in
the liquidation of Manufacturer's assets (or receive the benefits of
Manufacturer's reorganization plan) and Bystander's claim would not
be discharged because Bystander did not have a relationship with the
Manufacturer until after the filing of the bankruptcy petition.
Therefore, although Pilot could not collect her claims from the postdischarge income or property of Manufacturer, Bystander could
collect her claims from the post-discharge income or property of
Manufacturer, if there were any.
Finally, under the state law accrual-discovery test, neither Pilot nor
Bystander would be a "creditor" who would share in the liquidation of
Manufacturer's assets (or receive the benefits of Manufacturer's
reorganization plan). The claims of neither Pilot nor Bystander would
162. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) (2000) (providing that the effect of a confirmed
Chapter 11 plan is to discharge the debts of the debtor); id. § 1228 (authorizing a
discharge of debts of a debtor in a Chapter 12 case upon completion of all payments
required by a confirmed plan); id. § 1328 (same for debtor in a Chapter 13 case).
163. See id. § 727 (providing when an individual may receive a discharge of debts in
Chapter 7).
164. Corporations that liquidate under Chapter 7 do not receive a discharge, see id.
§ 727(a)(1), but do not need one. All assets of the corporation are used to pay
expenses and creditors and the corporation remains an empty shell that will
eventually be dissolved under state law.
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be discharged and, therefore, both Pilot and Bystander could collect
their claims from any post-discharge income or property of
Manufacturer.
The practical effects of the different treatment of the claims of Pilot
and Bystander are further complicated by the nature of Manufacturer
and the nature of the bankruptcy relief. If Manufacturer is an
individual who earns income after the discharge, Pilot and Bystander
might be better off not being "creditors" because they might be able
to obtain full payment from Manufacturer's postpetition income and
accumulated property. Similarly, if Manufacturer is a corporation that
successfully reorganizes under Chapter 11 of the Code, Pilot and
Bystander might be better off not being "creditors" because they
might be able to obtain full payment from Manufacturer's postpetition
income and accumulated property. However, if their claims are of
such a magnitude that prevents the confirmation and consummation
If
of a reorganization plan, Manufacturer will be liquidated.
Manufacturer liquidates as a corporation under Chapter 7 of the
Code, Pilot and Bystander would be better off being "creditors"
because they could at least share in Manufacturer's existing assets.
Those who are not "creditors" can only seek payment against an
empty shell. Therefore, if Manufacturer is a corporation, the ability of
Manufacturer to reorganize under Chapter 11 may depend on
whether Pilot and Bystander are included in the reorganization plan
as creditors.
These results are summarized in the following table:
Test

Share: current
assets

Share: future income of
individual or reorganized

Discharge for individual
or reorganized

corporation; claim against
liquidated corporate shell

corporation

Conduct

Pilot; Bystander

None

Pilot; Bystander

Relationship

Pilot

Bystander

Pilot

State accrual

None

Pilot; Bystander

None

In my view, the Bankruptcy Clause permits the broadest definition
of a claim, that is, a definition of a claim based on the conduct test
because, under state law, a claim comes into existence at the time of
the conduct. Latent defects in products and latent torts in the case of
services present two unknowns: whether (and when) a right to
payment will mature and who is the person with the right to payment.
These unknown contingencies, however, do not prevent the treatment
of the liability that arises out of prepetition conduct as a "right to
payment" that "arose" prepetition. Contingent rights to payment,
such as a guarantee issued prepetiton, have long been recognized as
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claims that can be administered in a bankruptcy case."' Moreover, if
a guarantor issues a guarantee of a negotiable instrument or other
type of assignable debt, the identity of the potential future claimantthe holder of the debt-is not known at the time of the issuance of the
guarantee. Accordingly, the fact that the issuer of the guarantee does
not know if it will have to pay the guarantee or who the future payee
will be does not prevent the payee with the guarantee from being a
"creditor" with a prepetition claim.
More broadly, any type of human activity-including the
manufacturing and selling of products and the provision of servicescreates under state law the possibility of a claim that will mature in the
future. This reality is well known. For example, assume that
Manufacturer is a corporation and that, instead of filing a bankruptcy
petition in Year 2, the owner of Manufacturer sells its stock to New
Stockholder. In Year 2, New Stockholder will care very much about
Manufacturer's possible liability to make payments in the future to
claimants for the conduct of Manufacturer in Year 1.
New
Stockholder will calculate the present value of such future payments
and will reduce the purchase price of Manufacturer's stock by that
amount. Indeed, a buyer of a business will often structure the
transaction to avoid any possible liability for actions taken by
Manufacturer in Year 1, such as by purchasing Manufacturer's assets
instead of buying the corporate entity. Such a purchase, however,
could also create future liability by the purchaser. 166 Hence, for state
law purposes, even though Pilot's and Bystander's cause of action
against the Manufacturer may not have accrued under a statute of
limitations in Year 2 and Manufacturer has no way of knowing the
identity of Bystander in Year 2, the actors in the real world will treat
the Manufacturer as having a liability based solely on the conduct of
Manufacturer in Year 1.
Because of Congress's discretion under the Debtor-Creditor
Adjustment Principle, the Code need not include all potential
"creditors" in a bankruptcy case. Whether all creditors should be
included is a matter of policy. 167 Nevertheless, Congress has implicitly
165. See, e.g., 19 Geo. 2, c. 32, § 2 (1746) (Eng.) (allowing an obligee under certain
insurance policies to prove a claim as a creditor of an insurer even if the claim were
still a contingent claim at the commencement of the case because the contingency
insured against had not occurred by that time).
166. The general rule is that a purchaser of assets for fair consideration does not
become liable for the seller's liabilities, even when the purchaser purchases
substantially all of the assets of the seller. See, e.g., Schwartz v. McGraw-Edison Co.,
92 Cal. Rptr. 776, 783 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971); Dana Corp. v. LTV Corp., 668 A.2d 752,
756 (Del. Ch. 1995); Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 451 N.E.2d 195, 198 (N.Y.
1983); Husak v. Berkel, Inc., 341 A.2d 174, 176 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975). Under certain
circumstances, however, a successor may be exposed to liability. See Restatement
(Third) of Torts § 12, Reporter's Note (1998) (collecting and discussing authorities);
Dobbs, supra note 161, § 375, at 1040.
167. See NBRC Rep., supra note 7, §§ 2.1.1-2.1.5, at 315-50 (proposing explicit
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adopted the conduct test for those persons who have claims as a result
of exposure to asbestos that will mature in the future. Section 524(g)
of the Code authorizes a bankruptcy court to enjoin any person from
seeking to collect a "demand" for damages resulting from exposure to
asbestos against a debtor that reorganizes pursuant to a plan that
meets the requirements of the section.168 One of the requirements is
that the reorganization plan establishes a trust fund to fund payments
to persons who may make such a "demand." The section also defines
a "demand" as a demand for payment that is not a "claim" in the
bankruptcy case.69
Section 524(g) essentially adopts the solution to latent asbestos tort
claims in the Johns-Manville bankruptcy reorganization. In that case,
Johns-Manville Corporation attempted to reorganize in the face of
substantial liability to persons who would have a future matured claim
for damages from exposure to asbestos that Johns-Manville
treatment of mass future claims in bankruptcy); Jeffrey Davis, Cramming Down
Future Claims in Bankruptcy: Fairness, Bankruptcy Policy, Due Process, and the
Lessons of the Piper Reorganization, 70 Am. Bankr. L.J. 329, 330, 361-62 (1996)
(arguing that all future claims based on prepetition conduct be treated as prepetition
or preconfirmation claims but proposing a flexible approach that would allow such
claims to be included or excluded from the bankruptcy process); Kathryn R. Heidt,
Future Claims in Bankruptcy: The NBC Amendments Do Not Go FarEnough, 69 Am.
Bankr. L.J. 515, 522 (1995) (proposing that Congress adopt the conduct test for when
a claim has arisen); Kathryn R. Heidt, Products Liability, Mass Torts and
EnvironmentalObligationsin Bankruptcy: Suggestions for Reform, 3 Am. Bankr. Inst.
L. Rev. 117, 127 (1995) (same); Frederick Tung, Taking Future Claims Seriously:
Future Claims and Successor Liability in Bankruptcy, 49 Case Western Res. L. Rev.
435, 442, 495-97 (1999) (arguing that all claims arising out of the debtor's prepetition
conduct should be included in a bankruptcy case).
In addition to policy considerations, Congressional authorization of the
discharge of claims deemed to arise at the time of the prepetition conduct must satisfy
other constitutional limitations, such as the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Davis, supra,
at 375-79 (arguing that subjecting all future claims to bankruptcy process would
satisfy due process concerns); Ralph R. Mabey & Jamie Andra Gavrin, Constitutional
Limitations on the Discharge of Future Claims in Bankruptcy, 44 S.C. L. Rev. 745,
760-84 (1993) (arguing that the discharge of future claims in a bankruptcy is
constitutional under the Fifth Amendment).
168. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(1) (2000) (providing that (A) "a court that enters an
order confirming a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 may issue, in connection
with such order, an injunction in accordance with this subsection to supplement the
injunctive effect of a discharge under this section" and (B) that an "injunction may be
issued under subparagraph (A) to enjoin entities from taking legal action for the
purpose of directly or indirectly collecting, recovering, or receiving payment or
recovery with respect to any claim or demand that, under a plan of reorganization, is
to be paid in whole or in part by a trust described in paragraph (2)(B)(i)").
169. See id. § 524(g)(5). The statute provides that, for this subsection:
the term 'demand' means a demand for payment, present or future, that (A)
was not a claim during the proceedings leading to the confirmation of a plan
of reorganization; (B) arises out of the same or similar conduct or events
that gave rise to the claims addressed by the injunction issued under
paragraph (1); and (C) pursuant to the plan, is to be paid by a trust described
in paragraph (2)(B)(i).
Id.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

1110

[Vol. 71

manufactured and sold before the filing of the bankruptcy petition. In
this case, the court never ruled that those "future claimants" were
"creditors" who had claims that "arose" before the petition.1 70
Nevertheless, the plan approved by the court treated these future
claimants in substantially the same way as those "creditors" who were
already identified as having claims for exposure to asbestos. 171 The
court entered an injunction against these future claimants that had the
same effect as a discharge of the creditors' claims under a
17
reorganization plan. 1
Hence, without calling these future claimants "creditors," Congress
specifically endorsed the treatment of the future claimants for
asbestos damages as "creditors" by validating an injunction against
these future claimants that requires them to seek payment only
pursuant to the plan. Congress may only do so if such an injunction is
within Congress's bankruptcy power. As discussed above, I believe
this aspect of section 524(g)'s limitation of the state law1 rights
of these
73
future claimants is permitted by the Bankruptcy Clause.
2.

Limitations of Creditor Rights

The Code's alteration of the state law rights of creditors fall well
within the Debtor-Creditor Adjustment Principle. Claims do not
accrue interest after the order for relief 74 unless the claim is secured
by property, the value of which exceeds the amount of the claim, 175 or76
the debtor has sufficient assets to pay all expenses and claims.
170. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743, 754 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(holding that future claimants who may have a cause of action for damages from
exposure to asbestos were parties in interest for which a future representative could
be appointed and noting that, in doing so, the court need not face the issue of the
dischargeability of the claims of these future claimants-that is, whether these future
claimants were "creditors" whose claims could be discharged by a plan), affd sub
nom. Robinson v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville), 52 B.R. 940, 943
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (rejecting the argument that the bankruptcy court's order made the
future claimants "creditors," and finding "no implication in the [court's order] that
the future claimants are 'creditors' whose interests are dischargeable in bankruptcy).
171. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 621-22 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(noting that the reorganization plan established a trust to resolve the claims of victims
of asbestos-related diseases that drew no distinction between victims on the basis of
the date of the manifestation of their disease), affd 78 B.R. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), affd
843 F.2d 636, 645-46 (2d Cir. 1988).
172. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. at 622,624.
173. On the other hand, section 524(g) authorizes an injunction precluding
claimants from seeking reimbursement from those who are not debtors under the
Code or their successors in interest. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(4) (2000). To the extent
that section 524(g) involuntarily deprives a person with such a claim her state law
right to collect from a non-debtor (other than a successor in interest to the debtor's
property), section 524(g) is constitutionally suspect. See Plank, The Erie Doctrine and
Bankruptcy, supra note 4.
174. See 1lU.S.C. § 502(b) (2).
175. See id. § 506(a), (b).
176. See id. § 726(a)(5), discussed infra note 184 and accompanying text.
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During the case, the Code stays creditors' enforcement actions.177 The
Code specifically allows an individual debtor to exempt from
creditors' claims some of the debtor's property that could otherwise
be used to satisfy those claims) 78 Other Code provisions expressly
overrule state law or the rights of creditors under state law,'79
including the rights of secured creditors.8 0
The Code does, as a matter of policy, respect some of the
nonbankruptcy rights of creditors. It has not abolished security
177. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (providing that the filing of a petition operates as a stay
of numerous acts against the debtor, property of the estate, or property of the
debtor).
178. See id. § 522(b). Section 522 provides that a debtor may exempt from the
claims of creditors in a bankruptcy case either (i) property described in section 522(d)
or (ii) property exempt under nonbankruptcy federal law or state or local law. See id.
§ 522(b)(2). The Code also provides that states may prohibit the debtor from using
the federal bankruptcy exemptions of the Code. See id. § 522(b)(1).
Many
commentators, including the Bankruptcy Review Commission, have criticized this
reliance on state law for exemptions. See NBRC Rep., supra note 7, § 1.2.1, at 121-25.
179. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 346(a), 728, 1146, 1231 (overruling the claims of certain
taxing authorities under state or local law); id. § 1123(a)(5)(G), (b)(1), (5) (providing
that, notwithstanding any otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law, a plan may cure
or waive any default, impair any class of unsecured claims, or modify the rights of
holders of unsecured claims); id. § 1222(b)(2), (3), (6) (providing that a plan may
modify the rights of holders of unsecured claims and cure or waive any default); id. §
1322(b)(2), (3), (6) (same).
180. The automatic stay prevents secured creditors from exercising their state law
rights to repossess and cause the sale of collateral securing the loan. See 11 U.S.C. §
362(a)(6) (staying any "act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that
arose before the commencement of the case"). Also, the trustee can grant a security
interest to another lender that has priority over the security interest of a secured
creditor. See id. § 364(d)(1)(B) (authorizing a superpriority lien if the trustee is
unable to obtain credit otherwise and if the interest of the existing secured creditor is
adequately protected). In addition, except for proceeds of or rents from prepetition
collateral, the filing of a bankruptcy petition prevents the attachment of a security
interest to collateral that is acquired by the debtor after the filing, notwithstanding a
security agreement granting the secured creditor a security interest in after-acquired
collateral. See id. § 552; see also id. § 522(f) (authorizing a debtor to avoid certain
liens to the extent that any such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would
have been entitled); id. § 1123(a)(5)(E), (F), (b)(1), (5) (providing that,
notwithstanding any otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law, a reorganization plan
may satisfy or modify any lien, cancel or modify any indenture or similar instrument,
impair any class of secured claims, modify the rights of holders of secured claims,
other than a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the
debtor's principal residence); id. § 1222(b)(2) (providing that a plan may modify the
rights of holders of secured claims); id. § 1322(b)(2) (same); id. § 1322(c) (providing
that, notwithstanding applicable nonbankruptcy law, a default with respect to, or that
gave rise to, a lien on the debtor's principal residence may be cured until such
residence is sold at a foreclosure sale that is conducted in accordance with applicable
nonbankruptcy law); Juliet M. Moringiello, A Tale of Two Codes: Examining § 522(j)
of the Bankruptcy Code, § 9-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Proper
Role of State Law in Bankruptcy, 79 Wash. U. L.Q. 863, 864, 888-90 (2001) (arguing
that Congress should define "purchase money security interest" for purposes of §
522(1)(B), which permits a debtor to avoid a non-purchase money security interest on
certain potentially exempt property, and noting that such a federal definition falls well
within the Bankruptcy Power).
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interests, and it respects at least the nominal value of security
interests 8 ' and setoff rights of creditors. 8 2 These choices, however,
are policy choices-good choices in my view. They are not mandated
by the Bankruptcy Clause, although they may be mandated by other
provisions of the Constitution.8 3
The only potential constitutional problem with the Code's
treatment of creditors is the provision for interest to be paid to
creditors under the rare case where there are sufficient assets to pay
the face amount of creditor claims. Specifically, section 726(a)(5)
authorizes the distribution of property of the estate, after the payment
of administrative expenses and allowed claims, for the payment of
interest "at the legal rate from the date of the filing of the petition" on
any allowed claim.' 84 Any residue goes to the debtor.8 5 The Code
does not specify what "legal rate" is to be used, but some courts have
held that the legal rate is the federal legal rate. 8 6 To the extent that
the federal legal rate is greater than the applicable rate under state
181. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 725 (requiring the trustee to distribute property in which
another entity has an interest to that entity); id. § 362(d)(1) (providing relief from the
automatic stay for cause, including lack of adequate protection of a creditor's security
interest); id. § 1129(a)(7),(b)(2)(A) (requiring that a confirmed plan give the secured
creditor the present value of its security interest).
182. See, e.g., id. § 506(a) (defining a claim subject to setoff as a secured claim); id.
§ 542(b) (providing that a person who owes a debt to the estate need not pay that
debt to the extent that the debt is subject to the person's setoff rights); id. § 553
(preserving setoff rights in bankruptcy).
183. See supra note 106 (suggesting that the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution
would prevent the abolition of security interests).
184. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a). The relevant subsections of this section provide::
(a) Except as provided in section 510 of this title, property of the estate shall
be distributed ... [(1) - (4) in payment of claims specified in section 507 and
in payment of any allowed unsecured claim, and] ...
(5) fifth, in payment of interest at the legal rate from the date of the filing of
the petition, on any claim paid under paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of this
subsection; and
(6) sixth, to the debtor.
Id.
185. See id.
186. In addition, if the debtor is solvent at the end of the case, it is a violation of the
Non-Expropriation Principle for the creditor to get less than it would be entitled to
under state law. Depriving the creditor of its state law interest rate is not necessary to
the adjustment of the insolvent debtor-creditor relationship when, at the end of the
bankruptcy process, there are sufficient assets to pay all creditors in full. Accordingly,
cases such as Onick v. Cardelucci (In re Cardelucci), 285 F.3d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding that "legal rate" of interest to which an unsecured creditor holding a
state court judgment was entitled on its claim in a Chapter 11 case of solvent debtor
was the federal judgment rate of 3.5%, rather than the California statutory rate of
10%), and Beguelin v. Volcano Vision, Inc. (In re Beguelin), 220 B.R. 94, 96 (9th Cir.
BAP 1998) (to the same effect, allowing a federal rate of 5% instead of the Nevada
legal rate of 10.25%) are wrongly decided. But see Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v.
Moneymaker (In re A & L Properties), 96 B.R. 287, 290 (C. D. Cal. 1988) (holding
that the "legal rate" is the rate specified in the contract and, alternatively, the
"applicable prejudgment rate" for breach of contract under state law, which is also
the rate specified in the contract).
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law (either the contract rate or the state's "legal rate"), this provision
authorizes, at the expense of the debtor, greater payments to creditors
in bankruptcy than they would receive outside of bankruptcy.'8 7 This
violates the Non-Expropriation Principle.
C.

Leases and Executory Contracts: The Mixed Treatment of Third
Parties

Executory contracts and leases in bankruptcy present more difficult
questions. An executory contract represents both a contingent asset
and a contingent liability for each party to the contract. For example,
assume that S and B enter into an agreement in which S agrees to sell
100 widgets at a future date to B for $20 for each widget, and B agrees
to buy those widgets. B has a contingent asset-the right to receive
the widgets upon payment for the widgets. B also has a contingent
liability-the obligation to pay for the widgets if S delivers for them.'8 8
Similarly, S has a contingent asset (the right to receive the payment of
$20 for each widget if S delivers them), and a contingent liability (the
1
obligation to deliver the widgets to B).'89
The relative value of each party's rights and obligations can change
after the date of the contract. If the market value of each widget
increases to $25, S as seller will have suffered an economic loss of $5 a
widget. S cannot avoid this loss by refusing to perform. If S fails to
deliver the widgets, B will have a damage claim for $5 a widget.19 °
Alternatively, if the market value of widgets decreases to $15, B as
buyer will have suffered an economic loss of $5 a widget. B cannot

187. A similar constitutional violation may occur under 11 U.S.C. § 506(b). Under
this section, oversecured creditors are entitled to interest on their claims. The section
is silent on the rate at which interest accrues, but many courts allow the accrual of
interest at the market rate and not the contract rate. See 2 Grant Gilmore & David
Gray Carlson, Gilmore and Carlson on Secured Lending: Claims in Bankruptcy,
§ 31.01, at 717-267 (2d ed. 2000). To the extent that the market rate is higher than the
contract rate, the debtor's property-or the property that the other creditors would
receive-is being expropriated to give the secured creditor more than it is entitled to
receive.
188. See U.C.C. § 2-507(1), (2) (2001) (providing that, unless otherwise agreed,
tender of delivery of goods is a condition to the buyer's obligation to pay for them,
and that the buyer's rights to retain or dispose of the goods is conditional upon the
buyer making any payment that is due).
189. See id. § 2-507(2) (providing that the buyer's rights to retain or dispose of the
goods is conditional upon the buyer making any payment that is due); id. § 2-511(1)
(providing that, unless otherwise agreed, tender of payment is a condition to the
seller's duty to tender and complete any delivery of goods).
190. See id. § 2-711(1) (providing that if the seller fails to deliver, the buyer can
cover and recover the difference between the cost of cover and the contract price-$5
a widget under the hypothetical-as provided in section 2-712, or recover damagesthe difference in market value and contract price, or $5 a widget-under section 2713).
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avoid this loss. If B repudiates the contract before the date of
delivery, S will have a damage claim for $5 a widget.19 '
If B files for bankruptcy, B's right under the contract to receive the
widgets becomes property of the estate, subject to the condition of full
payment. In the bankruptcy case, the other party to the contract has
potentially two roles, that of a creditor and that of a Third Party. If
the trustee cannot pay for the widgets, S is relieved of its obligations
to deliver them. If the contract is favorable to S, that is, the contract
price is higher than the market price, S may have a claim for damages
that initially arose, although it was contingent, upon the signing of the
contract. In this instance, S is a creditor, fully subject to the DebtorCreditor Adjustment Principle.
However, S's contingent obligation under the contract to deliver the
widgets does not make S a "creditor." S is a Third Party. Under the
Non-Expropriation Principle, S cannot be required to deliver the
widgets to the bankruptcy trustee (including B as debtor in
possession) if the trustee does not pay the full contract price for them.
Thus, although S has a contingent "right to payment" of $20 for each
widget delivered that arose before the filing of the petition, S cannot
be treated as a "creditor" who receives from the assets of the debtor,
B, only a pro-rata portion of the full price. That is, if all of B's
creditors were only to receive 50% of their claims in bankruptcy, B's
trustee cannot require S to deliver the widgets to the trustee for only
50% of the contract price. The Code, for the most part, implements
this principle in section 365, which authorizes the trustee to assume or
reject executory contracts.
Leases present more complications. For a lessee under a lease, the
lease is comparable to an executory contract. The lessee has both a
contingent asset and a contingent liability. The contingent asset is the
leasehold interest in the leased property items and any other
contractual rights under the lease, and the contingent liability is the
obligation to pay rent and to perform other any other contractual
obligations under the lease. 92 Hence, if the lessee becomes a debtor,
the lessee's rights become a contingent asset (to the extent that the
value of the rights under the lease exceeds the costs of the lease) that
can be used to pay creditors in a liquidation or a reorganization. If, at
the time of the filing of the petition, the lessee has not paid rent, the
lessor becomes a creditor with a claim for damages-the past due rent
and any other damages provided by the lease-subject to the
bankruptcy case. However, under the Non-Expropriation Principle,
the bankruptcy trustee for the lessee cannot retain the leasehold
interest without paying the full rent as well as otherwise complying
191. See id. § 2-706(1) (providing that the seller can resell the goods and recover
damages in an amount equal to the difference in resale price-$15 in our
hypothetical-and the contract price, or $5 a widget).
192. See, e.g. Stoebuck & Whitman, supra note 136, § 6.10, at 253-54.
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fully with the lease. If the trustee fails to pay the rent that accrues
after the filing of the bankruptcy petition, the Non-Expropriation
Principle dictates that the lessor must be allowed to terminate the
lease and regain possession of the leased property item.
For a lessor, the lease need not be comparable to an executory
contract. The lessor has conveyed to the lessee a property interest-a
leasehold-but may have no other obligations under the lease. The
lessee's interests may be contingent upon the lessee performing her
obligations under the lease, but no action by the lessor can deprive the
lessee of her interest. If the lessor has no other obligations under the
lease, then the lease is a grant of a property interest and has none of
the characteristics of an executory contract because the lessor has
fully performed its obligations. 9 3 If the lessor becomes a debtor in
bankruptcy, the bankruptcy trustee for the lessor cannot adversely
affect the lessee's interests so long as the lessee performs her
obligations under the lease. Again, the Code's treatment of leases
applies the Debtor-Creditor Adjustment Principle and, for the most
part, complies with the Non-Expropriation Principle. The Code does,
however, authorize violations of the Non-Expropriation Principle.
1.

Rejection

Under section 365(a), the trustee may reject executory contracts
and leases.194 This power does not violate the Non-Expropriation
Principle and is consistent with the Debtor-Creditor Adjustment
Principle. Rejection is simply the trustee's determination not to
perform the debtor's obligations under the contract or lease."'
In the case of an executory contract, rejection by trustee does not
change the other party's rights. Outside of bankruptcy, either party
could choose not to perform the contract. Under state law, a party's
failure to perform typically creates a claim for damages. If the
breaching party were insolvent, the other party's chances for
collecting its claim for damages against the insolvent breaching party
is no better than what the other party would receive in a bankruptcy
case.

193. See id. § 6.12, at 256-57.
194. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2000) (stating that "[e]xcept as provided in sections
765 and 766 of this title and in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section, the trustee,
subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor).
195. See Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding
"Rejection," 59 U. Colo. L. Rev. 845, 848-49, 931 (1988) (stating that "rejection" of an
executory contract or a lease is a decision by the trustee not to assume the contract or
lease); Jay L.Westbrook, A FunctionalAnalysis of Executory Contracts, 74 Minn. L.
Rev. 227, 230, 250-51, 281 (1989) (stating that "rejection" of an executory contract or
a lease is a decision by the trustee to breach the contract).
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Recall our hypothetical contract in which S agrees to sell 100
widgets for $20 each. Assuming no transaction costs, if the market
value of the widgets increases to $25 and S fails to deliver the widgets
to B, S owes B $500 in damages. If S owes $500 to only one other
creditor, and S has only $500 in assets, the present value of B's
contract claim against S is $250 because B has a 50% chance of
collecting its $500 debt. If B is the first to levy on S's assets, B would
be paid in full. If the other creditor levies first, B gets zero.
Inside bankruptcy, rejection by the trustee for S puts B in the same
"' B has a right to payment
place. 96
that arose upon the execution of the
contract and that matures upon rejection. Hence, in our hypothetical
in which the price of widgets has increased to $25 a widget, the trustee
in bankruptcy for S will reject the contract to sell the 100 widgets for
$20 because the contract is a net burden to the estate. B will have a
claim for damages for $500 in bankruptcy, just as it has a claim outside
of bankruptcy. 197 B's other creditor will have a claim for $500. B will
receive a pro rata share of S's assets, 50%, or $250.
Similarly, rejection by the trustee of a lease simply allows the other
party to terminate the lease and seek damages. If the debtor is a
lessee, rejection of a lease therefore allows the lessor to regain
possession of the leased property as well as to seek damages from the
debtor/lessee. If the lease is a net burden to the estate (the market
value of the rent is less than the contract amount of the rent) the
trustee will reject the lease as a net burden to the estate. If the lessor
for some reason elects not to terminate the lease and tries to hold the
trustee to the terms of the lease by insisting that the trustee still has a
property interest the trustee must continue to pay for, the trustee can
simply abandon the leasehold to the lessor.' 98
On the other hand, if the debtor is a lessor, the results of rejection
are different. Because rejection of a lease is a determination not to
perform the obligations of the lessor, rejection may give the lessee the
option to return possession of the leased property item to the trustee.
On the other hand, if the lessor has no obligations to the lessee,
rejection may not even give the lessee an option to return possession
and use of the property item to the lessor.
In either event, if the lessee wishes to retain the leased property
item notwithstanding the refusal of the trustee as lessor to perform the
lessor's obligations, rejection does not allow the trustee as lessor to
regain possession of the leased property item from the lessee. The
lessee has a property interest in the item-the right to possess and to
use the premises and the right to exclude others from using the leased
196. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(g).
197. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
198. See 11 U.S.C. § 544 (providing that after notice and a hearing, the trustee may
abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of
inconsequential value and benefit to the estate).

2002]

BANKRUPTCY AND FEDERALISM

1117

property item. Under the Non-Expropriation Principle, rejection of a
lease by the trustee may not alter that property interest. The Code
explicitly recognizes this principle for a lease of a real property item. 99
Courts must also respect this principle for leases of personal property
items.
2.

Assumption and Assignment

Under section 365(a) & (f), the trustee may assume executory
contracts and leases and assign them to strangers notwithstanding an
anti-assignment provision under state law or in the contract or lease. z0
Under the Non-Expropriation Principle, bankruptcy law may not
force Third Parties to enter into or maintain a legal relationship with
the debtor to an extent greater than that required by nonbankruptcy
law. This Principle is limited only by the Non-Interference Principle.
Bankruptcy law may prevent a Third Party from using a debtor's
resort to bankruptcy to obtain a benefit that it could not obtain
outside of bankruptcy.
199. See id. § 365(h)(1) (providing that if the trustee rejects an unexpired lease of
real property under which the debtor is the lessor and the rejection amounts to a
breach that would entitle the lessee to treat the lease as terminated under its terms,
applicable nonbankruptcy law, or any agreement made by the lessee, then the lessee
under such lease may treat such lease as terminated by the rejection or the lessee may
retain its rights under such lease in or appurtenant to the real property to the extent
that such rights are enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law, but giving the
lessee the right to offset against the rent the value of any damage caused by the
nonperformance of any obligation of the debtor).
200. These subsections state:
(a) Except as provided in sections 765 and 766 of this title and in subsections
(b), (c), and (d) of this section, the trustee, subject to the court's approval,
may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the
debtor.
(f)(1) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, notwithstanding a
provision in an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, or in
applicable law, that prohibits, restricts, or conditions the assignment of such
contract or lease, the trustee may assign such contract or lease under
paragraph (2) of this subsection; [certain exceptions omitted].
(2) The trustee may assign an executory contract or unexpired lease of the
debtor only if(A) the trustee assumes such contract or lease in accordance with the
provisions of this section; and
(B) adequate assurance of future performance by the assignee of such
contract or lease is provided, whether or not there has been a default in such
contract or lease.
(3) Notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or unexpired lease
of the debtor, or in applicable law that terminates or modifies, or permits a
party other than the debtor to terminate or modify, such contract or lease or
a right or obligation under such contract or lease on account of an
assignment of such contract or lease, such contract, lease, right, or obligation
may not be terminated or modified under such provision because of the
assumption or assignment of such contract or lease by the trustee.
See id. § 365.
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The issue of an anti-assignment provision arises in two instances.
First, should an anti-assignment provision prevent the trustee in
bankruptcy (which includes the debtor as debtor in possession) from
assuming the executory contract or leases? Second, if the trustee may
assume the contract or lease, may she assign it to another person? In
many situations, the abrogation of anti-assignment provisions in
contracts and leases for either assumption or assignment to a third
person does not violate the Non-Expropriation Principle.
Nevertheless, the trustee's power does violate the Non-Expropriation
Principle when it authorizes the abrogation of the state law right of
the other party to prevent assignment for a reason other than the
debtor's seeking bankruptcy relief.
State law overrules prohibitions on the assignment of many contract
rights when the assignment does not change the substantive rights of
the other party and the other party to the contract receives the benefit
of its bargain. For example, an obligor under a contract for the
payment of money, e.g., a seller of goods under a sales contract, may
not prevent the other party from assigning the right to payment.20 '
Other rights under a contract may generally be assigned unless the
assignment would be detrimental to the other party.2 2 Hence, the

201. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-210(2) (2001) (providing that a right to damages or to
payment upon performance of a contract for the sale of goods may be assigned
notwithstanding an agreement otherwise); id. §§ 9-404(d), 9-408 (generally
invalidating anti-assignment provisions in agreements or law that would prevent or
limit the sale or pledge of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and
promissory notes but also, in the case of certain transfers of payment intangibles or
promissory notes, limiting the rights of the assignee to proceed against the other party
to the agreement), analyzed in Thomas E. Plank, The Limited Security Interest in
Non-Assignable Collateral Under Revised Article 9, 9 Amer. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 323
(2001); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 317 cmt. c (noting the
disappearance of the common law historical rule that choses in action could not be
assigned and stating that, except as stated in this section, discussed infra note 202,
contract rights may effectively be assigned).
202. Section 2-210 provides:
(1) A party may perform his duty through a delegate unless otherwise
agreed or unless the other party has a substantial interest in having his
original promisor perform or control the acts required by the contract. ...
(2) Except as otherwise provided in Section 9-406, unless otherwise agreed,
all rights of either seller or buyer can be assigned except where the
assignment would materially change the duty of the other party, or increase
materially the burden or risk imposed on him by his contract, or impair
materially his chance of obtaining return performance....
See UCC § 2-210 (2001); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 317(2)(a), (c)
(providing that a contractual right can be assigned unless the assignment materially (i)
changes the duty of the other party, (ii) increases the burden on or risk to the other
party, or (iii) impairs the chance for return performance, or unless the assignment is
validly precluded by contract); id. § 322(2) (providing that, unless other intent is
manifest, a contract provision prohibiting assignment may give rise to right to
damages but does not render the assignment ineffective); 1 Grant Gilmore, Security
Interests in Personal Property §§ 7.3-7.5, at 200-10 (1965).
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power of the trustee to assign an executory contract mirrors state law
in many respects.
State law does protect one party to a contract from having to accept
performance from a stranger when the identity of the other original
party is significant." 3 Accordingly, to the degree provided for by state
law, bankruptcy law may not force a Third Party to accept
performance from the bankruptcy trustee or an assignee of the trustee
if such performance depends on the specific identity of the debtor.

The Code protects this Third Party right in section 365(c)(1). °4
The language of section 365(c)(1) has generated significant
controversy and litigation.
The plain language establishes a
"hypothetical test"-whether applicable law excuses the other party
from accepting performance from a stranger-for when the trustee
may assume a contract. This language presents an anomalous
situation when the debtor in possession seeks to assume the contract.
The debtor in possession is the same entity as the debtor 0 5 although
in a different capacity,2 °6 but the literal language prevents the debtor
in possession from assuming the contract.
Agreeing with most scholars, some courts consider this result an
anomaly, and have interpreted this language to require an actual
assignment to a person other than the debtor in possession or
prejudice to the other party to the contract from assumption by the
debtor in possession as a condition to preventing assumption by a
debtor in possession.2 " 7 Although I think courts should follow the
203. See U.C.C. § 2-210(1) (2001), quoted supra note 202; see also Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 318(2) (permitting the delegation of an obligation to perform
unless the obligee has substantial interest in performance by the original obligor).
204. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c) (2000), which provides:
The trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract or unexpired
lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or
restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties, if(1)(A) applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such
contract or lease from accepting performance from or rendering
performance to an entity other than the debtor or the debtor in possession,
whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of
rights or delegation of duties; and
(B) such party does not consent to such assumption or assignment...
205. See id. § 1107 (providing that, subject to any limitations on a trustee serving in
a case under Chapter 11, a debtor in possession shall have all the rights, other than
the right to compensation, and powers, and shall perform all the functions and duties,
with certain exceptions not relevant to a debtor in possession, of a trustee serving in a
case under Chapter 11).
206. See Thomas E. Plank, The Bankruptcy Trust as a Legal Person, 35 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 251, 289-91 (2000) (arguing that the debtor in possession is not a
separate legal entity, but that the Bankruptcy Code creates a separate legal entity, the
bankruptcy trust, for which the debtor in possession is the trustee).
207. See, e.g., Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Leroux, 69 F.2d 608, 612, 614 (1st Cir.
1995). See generally Daniel J. Bussel & Edward A. Friedler, The Limits on Assuming
and Assigning Executory Contracts, 74 Am. Bankr. L.J. 321 (2000) (providing a good
summary of the controversy and proposing an interpretation that harmonizes §
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hypothetical test mandated by the statute, the "actual test" is
constitutionally permissible so long as bankruptcy courts apply the
test in a neutral manner and respect the nonbankruptcy interests of
the non-debtor party.
However, in some circumstances, the "actual test" permits a debtor
in possession to evade a restriction on assignment that would
otherwise be enforceable under the "actual test." For example, under
the "actual test," a debtor in possession who held a patent license
cannot assign the license to an assignee that is not acceptable to the
licensor. Nevertheless, under this test it could, pursuant to a
reorganization plan, assume the license and become the wholly owned
subsidiary of the unacceptable assignee.2" Hence, the actual test
would need to be modified and applied in a way that prevents this
evasion of the substantive right of the Third Party licensor.
State law also respects the choice that parties make in contracts and
leases to prevent a party from assigning that party's rights under the
lease or contract even when the identity of the party to the contract is

not an essential element of the contract.2 " 9 This kind of an antiassignment provision may protect the legitimate interests of the
parties in the performance of the contract or lease, such as the interest
of a landlord in preserving the value of leased premises. The Code
partially protects these interests and ameliorates the effect of the
invalidation of an anti-assignment provision on the state law rights of
the non-debtor party. Specifically, section 363(f)(2) requires as a
condition to assignment of the debtor rights and duties under a
contract or lease to another person that the trustee provided adequate
assurance of due performance by that other person.
An anti-assignment provision, however, may also be used by one of
the parties to recapture a future benefit that it otherwise would have
365(c)(1) with § 365(f)(1), which overrides nonbankruptcy law that would prevent
assignment of an executory contract or unexpired lease to another party).
208. Compare Perlman v. Catapult Entertainment, Inc. (In re Catapult
Entertainment, Inc.), 165 F.2d 747, 747-48, 750-51 (9th Cir. 1999) (under the
hypothetical test, not permitting the assumption of a patent license by the debtor in
possession whose reorganization plan provided that the debtor in possession became
a wholly owned subsidiary of another corporation), with Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge
Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489, 491, 493-94 (1st Cir. 1997) (under the actual test,
approving the assumption of a patent license by the debtor in possession over the
objections of the licensor, even though the reorganization plan provided that the
debtor in possession became a wholly owned subsidiary of a competitor of the
licensor and the licensor would not have consented to an assignment to such
competitor). The court of appeals in Institut Pasteur made much of the fact that the
licensor had not negotiated a provision limiting or terminating the license upon a
change in the corporate control of the debtor, see id. at 494-95, but did not consider
that such a change in the control provision would likely be an unenforceable ipsofacto or anti-assignment clause.
209. See, e.g., Stoebuck & Whitman, supra note 136, § 6.71, at 385-87 (noting the
enforceability of anti-assignment clauses but describing the judicial hostility to such
clauses).
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contracted away. This use may be the reason for judicial hostility to
anti-assignment provisions.21 ° Some may not consider this ability to be
a legitimate interest. Nevertheless, state law still protects this interest
to a certain extent.
A hypothetical will illustrate this point. Assume that landlord L
leased a parcel of real estate for a 10-year term to tenant T for a fixed
rent of $10,000 a month, which was the fair market rent at the time of
the lease. Assume, however, that five years has passed and the fair
market rent has increased to $15,000 a month. L can do nothing
about this unfavorable lease for another five years so long as T
performs the lease. Without a restriction on assignment, T could
assign the lease to assignee A for the present value of the increase in
value of the leasehold, that is, the present value of $5,000 a month for
the next five years. This increase in value is substantial, and it
represents the increase in the market value of the lease to the lessee.21'
If the lease contains an anti-assignment provision, however, L can
prevent the assignment to A.
L has an interest in assuring that A, as the new tenant, has the
financial capacity and character to assure payment of the rent and
maintenance of the leased premises. The use of an anti-assignment
provision to protect this interest is unexceptional. On the other hand,
L could use the anti-assignment provision in the lease to extract from
T some of the increase in market value of the leasehold. Such use of
an anti-assignment provision appears to contradict the property
interest that L conveyed to T. If L wanted to retain the benefit of
increased market rents, it could have leased the premises for a shorter
term. Of course, under a shorter term, L would also have taken the
concomitant risk of a decline in market rent at the end of the shorter
term. Under the hypothetical 10-year lease, however, T took the risk
of a decrease in market rents.212
It is not necessarily "unfair" to allow L to capture the upside in
future market value but stick T with the downside. L also retains a
significant risk of the downside. If market values decline and T can no
longer pay the now higher than market rent-a likely occurrence in
the case of a general economic decline-L can exercise its remedies.
L can retake the premises, rent it at the lower rent, and seek damages
from T representing the difference between the present value of the
lease rent and the now market rent. Even without bankruptcy,

210. See, e.g., 1 Gilmore, supra note 202, §§ 7.6-7.9, at 210-28.
211. The present value of $5,000 a month for the next five years at an annual
discount rate of 12%, calculated on a monthly basis, is approximately $225,000.
212. If the rental value had declined, say to $6,000 a month, for a loss in rental
value of $4,000 a month, the trustee would reject the lease, and L would be entitled to
terminate the lease. L would have a claim in bankruptcy for damages, although the
damages are limited. Since L is a creditor in this instance, the Code may alter his
state law rights to damages.
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however, there is no assurance that L will be able to collect those
damages. Accordingly, allowing L to recapture a portion of the
possible-but not assured-increase in market value of the leasehold
when a lessee seeks to assign it may be reasonable compensation for
the risk that L will bear the loss of a possible-but not assured-decline
in the market value of the leasehold.
Although state courts have been hostile to anti-assignment
provisions, state law does respect the use of the anti-assignment
provision to recapture an increase in market rents as an important and
legitimate interest of the lessor when the parties clearly express their
intent.2" 3 Therefore, section 363(f)(1)'s abrogation of anti-assignment
provisions does violate the Non-Expropriation Principle. If T files for
bankruptcy and the trustee rejects the lease because the value of the
leasehold has declined-making the lease burdensome to the estateL suffers the loss. L only obtains a limited part of its market rate
damages. 1 4 On the other hand, if the trustee assumes the lease
because the value of the leasehold has increased and then assigns the
lease, the trustee receives the benefit of the increase in market value,
which is distributed to creditors. L cannot obtain any of that increase.
Section 365 is also constitutionally problematic in other ways. To
ensure further that the trustee's power to assume and assign executory
contracts and leases does not violate the Non-Expropriation Principle,
that power must be subject to other limitations that, unfortunately,
the Code does not contain. First, to the extent that a party has a state
law right to terminate or cancel a contract (for reasons other than the
bankruptcy of the other party, which is discussed below215),
bankruptcy law must respect this right. The Code may not prevent a
Third Party from exercising these state law rights.
Second, to the extent that the other party is forced to maintain an
ongoing relationship with the bankruptcy trustee (including the
debtor in possession), that Third Party should have the right to
receive adequate assurance of due performance of the obligations of
213. See, e.g., Stoebuck & Whitman, supra note 136, § 6.71, at 387.
214. Not only will L's damages be paid on a pro-rata basis along with the other
creditors, the Code specifically limits the amount of damages resulting from the
decline in the market value of a real estate leasehold. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6)(A).
This subsection disallows any claim of a lessor for damages resulting from the
termination of a lease of real property to the extent that such claim exceeds:
(A) the rent reserved by such lease, without acceleration, for the greater of
one year, or 15 percent, not to exceed three years, of the remaining term of
such lease, following the earlier of (i) the date of the filing of the petition;
and (ii) the date on which such lessor repossessed, or the lessee surrendered,
the leased property.
Id. The landlord can claim full damages for rent due before the times specified in
section 502(b)(6)(A). See id. 502(b)(6)(B).
215. If the cancellation is the result of the filing of the bankruptcy petition, such
cancellation would violate the Non-Interference principle. See supra note 114 and
accompanying text.
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the trustee as successor in interest to the debtor. Although the Code
expressly provides for such assurance when the trustee seeks to cure a
default in the contract or lease and then assume,216 or when the trustee
seeks to assign a contract or lease to another entity,217 the Code does
not require adequate assurance of due performance by the trustee
(including the debtor in possession) when there has been no default
and the contract or lease is not being assigned. Under state law, all
parties to a contract or a lease are entitled to this assurance. 21s This
requirement must be respected in a bankruptcy case.
Under the Non-Interference Principle, the trustee may be allowed a
short period of time before Third Parties may exercise their
nonbankruptcy rights, so long as such delay does not prejudice their
rights.1 9 Currently, in a liquidation, the bankruptcy trustee has sixty
216. Section 365(b)(1) provides:
If there has been a default in an executory contract or unexpired lease of the
debtor, the trustee may not assume such contract or lease unless, at the time
of assumption of such contract or lease, the trustee(A) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will promptly
cure, such default;
(B) compensates, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will
promptly compensate, a party other than the debtor to such contract or
lease, for any actual pecuniary loss to such party resulting from such default;
and
(C) provides adequate assurance of future performance under such contract
or lease.
(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to a default that is a
breach of a provision relating to(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any time before the
closing of the case;
(B) the commencement of a case under this title;
(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a case under this
title or a custodian before such commencement; or
(D) the satisfaction of any penalty rate or provision relating to a default
arising from any failure by the debtor to perform nonmonetary obligations
under the executory contract or unexpired lease.
11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1).
217. Section 365(f)(2) states:
The trustee may assign an executory contract or unexpired lease of the
debtor only if(A) the trustee assumes such contract or lease in accordance with the
provisions of this section; and
(B) adequate assurance of future performance by the assignee of such
contract or lease is provided, whether or not there has been a default in such
contract or lease.
Id. § 365 (f)(2). Thus, the trustee need not cure a prepetition default of a covenant to
maintain a certain positive net worth in assuming an executory contract or unexpired
lease under section 365(b)(2), quoted supra note 216, but if the trustee wants to assign
the contract or lease it must assure adequate performance by any assignee of such
contract, including a net worth covenant. Id. § 365(f)(2)(B).
218. See U.C.C. § 2-609 (2001), discussed infra note 229 and accompanying text;
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251 (1981), discussed infra note 229 and
accompanying text.
219. In addition, the Code extends the time period in which the debtor may take
legal action against a Third Party. See 11 U.S.C. § 108(a) (time period within which
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days to decide whether to assume or reject an executory contract or
unexpired lease. 220 As a general matter, this sixty days may be a
reasonable limitation. After all, the trustee needs time to sort out the

affairs of the debtor.
The bankruptcy court may extend this sixty days, but as matter of
constitutional right it may do so only if such extension does not
prejudice the Third Party's rights. Further, to the extent that any
delay does prejudice the rights of the Third Party-say, because of a
change in market conditions or the loss of an opportunity-the
bankruptcy estate should compensate the Third Party fully for such
loss. The bankruptcy case is administered for the benefit of the
creditors,

and

the

creditors

should

bear

the

costs

of such

administration-not the Third Party.22'
Reorganizations are more problematic. In a reorganization, the
trustee has until plan confirmation to accept or reject an executory
222
contract or a lease, other than a lease of non-residential property.
To the extent that federal courts in bankruptcy interpret the
provisions of section 365 to require that Third Parties continue to
perform the contract or lease in the face of the debtor's or trustee's
nonperformance,2 23 this amount of time would be unreasonable and
the debtor may commence an action extended two years); id. § 108(b) (time period
within which the debtor may file any pleading, demand, notice, or proof of claim or
loss, cure a default, or perform any other similar act extended 60 days after the order
for relief).
220. See id. § 365(d)(1) (executory contract or unexpired lease of residential real
property or of personal property); id. § 365(d)(4) (deeming any unexpired lease of
nonresidential real property rejected unless assumed within 60 days); see also id. §
365(d)(3) (requiring the trustee to perform all the obligations of the debtor arising
after the order for relief under any unexpired lease of nonresidential real property,
until such lease is assumed or rejected, except that such time for performance may be
extended by no more than 60 days).
221. See, e.g., Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471 (1968) (holding that the
bankruptcy estate of a debtor that attempted to reorganize under chapter XI of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 should bear the costs of damages caused by the receiver's
negligence since the chapter XI case was attempted for the benefit of the creditors
and therefore such damages should be treated as an administrative expense).
222. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2).
223. One author has stated that the non-debtor party to a contract is bound by the
contract but the debtor party is not bound. See Douglas W. Bordewieck, The
Postpetition, Pre-Rejection, Pre-Assumption Status of an Executory Contract, 59 Am.
Bankr. L. J. 197, 200, 214 (1985). This can only be true in a limited sense. Certainly,
the non-debtor party cannot obtain specific performance of the contract, and indeed
for a limited period of time may be precluded from terminating the contract. The
trustee has a right to assume an executory contract, and section 365 puts the burden
on the non-debtor party to seek an expedited decision. Nevertheless, the non-debtor
party-a Third Party-cannot be forced to perform the contract unless it is assured of
performance by the trustee, and its ability to terminate the contract should not be
frustrated if the trustee refuses both to perform and to reject the contract. See also In
re El Paso Refinery, L.P., 220 B.R. 37 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1998). In this case, the
bankruptcy court, citing Bordewieck and a few cases, stated that a non-debtor party
cannot enforce the contract against the debtor and therefore cannot obtain relief from
the automatic stay to terminate the contract. Id. at 43-46. However, the court had
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unconstitutional. One saving provision allows the other party to
request expedited decision. 224 As a matter of constitutional right, the
court must require an expedited decision if delay will prejudice the
rights of the other party.
Other sections provide a partial cure to the potential
unconstitutional deprivation of Third Party rights. In the case of a
nonresidential real property lease, such lease is deemed rejected if not
assumed within sixty days after the order for relief.225 For most
personal property leases, the trustee must perform the debtor's
obligations within sixty days of the order for relief until the lease is
either assumed or rejected. 26
These sections, by themselves, provide only a partial cure. First,
there is no requirement for performance of obligations under
executory contracts pending rejection or assumption. Second, the
Code excuses the trustee from performing obligations under
residential real property leases and personal property leases for
personal, family, or household uses. 227 This exception may be
desirable to protect consumer debtors, but in my view it is not
constitutionally permissible. If an individual debtor files for Chapter
11 and wishes to continue to live in a rented apartment, whether a
penthouse suite or a one-room efficiency apartment, and to continue
to drive his leased automobile, whether it be a Maserati or a Hyundai,
he should be required to make all payments and perform all other
obligations. If he cannot so perform, he should give up the apartment
or the car.
The failure of the Code to require performance of certain leases
and contracts would not be constitutionally problematic if the Third
Parties were allowed to exercise their nonbankruptcy rights after the
first sixty days. In the case of leases, exercising these remedieseviction from the residential rental property or repossession of the
personal property item-would require lifting the stay against acts to
In the case of
obtain possession of property from the estate.2
previously granted relief from the automatic stay to permit termination of a contract.
Id. at 47-50. Accordingly, it held that such grant of relief was in effect a decision
giving the debtor a limited amount of time to assume or reject the contract, and it
allowed the non-debtor damages as if the debtor had rejected the contract. Id.
224. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2) (2000).
225. See id. § 365(c)(4).
226. See id. § 365(d)(3).
227. See id. § 365 (d)(10).
228. See id. § 362(a)(3) (providing that the filing of a petition stays "any act to
obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate"); id. §
362(d) (providing that "[o]n request of a party in interest and after notice and a
hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this
section, such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay (1) for
cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of such
party in interest"). Failure of a party to a contract or lease to receive or secure the
benefit of its nonbankruptcy property interests would be lack of adequate protection,
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contracts, exercising these remedies would include suspending
performance until the trustee provided adequate assurance of due
performance from the other party, and canceling the contract if such
assurance is not provided. 229 Bankruptcy law may not interfere with
this right.23
D. Invalidation of "Ipso-Facto"Provisions

"Ipso-facto" provisions are those provisions found in
nonbankruptcy law23' and agreements 23 2 that allow the discretionary
but providing adequate assurance of due performance would suffice as adequate
protection.
229. See U.C.C. § 2-609 (2001) (providing that a party to a contract who has
reasonable grounds for insecurity with respect to the performance by the other party
may demand adequate assurance of due performance and may suspend performance
until assurance is received; failure of the other party to provide such assurance within
a reasonable time constitutes a repudiation of the contract); id. § 2-703(f) (seller's
right to cancel contract if buyer repudiates); id. § 2-711(1) (buyer's right to cancel
contract if seller repudiates); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251 (1981)
(providing a procedure for obtaining adequate assurance of due performance similar
to U.C.C. § 2-609, supra); id. § 252 (providing similar relief if one party becomes
insolvent); id. § 253(2) (providing that one party's repudiation discharges other
party's remaining duties to perform).
230. As a matter of strict statutory interpretation, the Code respects this right. The
automatic stay precludes acts "to exercise control over property of the estate." See 11
U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). A debtor's rights under a contract are property of the estate
under § 541 (a)(1). Those rights, however, are subject to a condition that, if a party to
a contract with the debtor becomes insecure about the debtor's ability to perform the
contract, the other party may demand adequate assurance of due performance,
suspend performance until assurance is received, and cancel the contract if the
assurance is not provided or if the debtor defaults. See supra note 229. Hence, the
property of the estate contains its own inherent limitation. Just as the automatic
termination of a debtor's leasehold interest under lease for a five-year term at the end
of five years is an inherent part of the limitation on the property of the estate, the
ending of the estate's interests in a contract pursuant to the contract's own limitations
is part of the property of the estate. Just as the termination of the five-year leasehold
in favor of the landlord is not "exercising control" over property of the estate, the
termination of the contract by the other party consistent with the inherent limitations
in the contract also in not "exercising control" over property of the estate. See
Thomas E. Plank, The Creditor in Possession Under the Bankruptcy Code: History,
Text, and Policy, 59 Md. L. Rev. 253, 312-16 (2000) (explaining why a secured
creditor's exercise of its nonbankruptcy rights against a property item previously
owned by the debtor and now by the estate is not an act to control property of the
estate stayed by § 362(a)(3), but is an act to collect a claim stayed by § 362(a)(6));
Plank, Bankruptcy Estate, supra note 137 at 1193, 1219-34, 1254-63 (explaining that
Congress intentionally defined property of the estate to contain only those specific
rights in a property item that a debtor had and how Citizens Bank of Maryland v.
Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 21 (1995), endorsed this explicit definition of property of the
estate to exclude from property of the estate the rights that an entity other than the
estate has in the property item).
231. See, e.g., Unif. Limited Liability Co. Act § 601(7) (1995), 6A U.L.A. 425, 472
(1995) (providing that a member in a limited liability company will become
disassociated from the limited liability company upon becoming a debtor in
bankruptcy or upon certain other enumerated events of bankruptcy); Del. Code Ann.
tit. 6, § 18-304 (providing that, unless otherwise agreed, a member in a limited liability
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or automatic termination of the debtor's contract and property rights
because the debtor filed a bankruptcy petition or becomes
insolvent. 233 They can be justified under state law on the theory that
the bankruptcy of one party in a transaction signals that party's
inability to perform. On the other hand, an ipso-facto provision also
allows the other party in a transaction to recapture a net benefit that it
had contracted or conveyed away to the party that becomes a debtor
in bankruptcy.
For example, if continued performance of an
executory contract by the Third Party is a net benefit for the debtor

(and therefore the bankruptcy estate), it is also a net burden to the
Third Party. 234 Even if the debtor or the bankruptcy trustee can
continue to perform, the "ipso-facto" provision would allow the Third
Party to get out of an unfavorable transaction.
If the bankruptcy trustee cannot perform the contract, requiring
continued performance by the Third Party would violate the NonExpropriation Principle. However, if the trustee can perform the
contract and the Third Party continues to receive the benefit of the
bargain, no matter how unfavorable that bargain may have become
for the Third Party, requiring the Third Party to continue to perform

does not violate the Non-Expropriation Principle. Under the NonInterference Principle, if the Third Party may not avoid its obligations
under an unfavorable contract under state law (aside from the "ipsofacto" provision), it may not use the filing of relief under bankruptcy
law to avoid the burden in bankruptcy. Prohibiting the Third Party
from using the filing for bankruptcy relief to recapture this benefit
does not violate the Non-Expropriation Principle, so long as the Third
company ceases to be a member upon filing a voluntary petition in bankruptcy or
otherwise is subject to several enumerated events of bankruptcy); Unif. Limited
Partnership Act § 603(6) (2001), 6A U.L.A. 1, 54 (2002 Supp.) (providing that a
general partner in a limited partnership will become disassociated from the limited
partnership upon becoming a debtor in bankruptcy or upon certain other enumerated
events of bankruptcy); Rev. Unif. Ltd. Partnership Act § 402(4) (1985), 6A U.L.A. 1,
172 (1995) (providing that, unless otherwise agreed, a general partner in a limited
partnership ceases to be a general partner upon filing a voluntary petition in
bankruptcy or otherwise is subject to several enumerated events of bankruptcy); Unif.
Partnership Act § 601(6) (1997), 6 U.L.A. (pt. 1) 1, 163-64 (2001) (providing that a
partner will become disassociated from a partnership upon becoming a debtor in
bankruptcy or upon other enumerated events of bankruptcy).
232. 5A Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d § 68:297, at 454 (2002) (providing an example of
a provision permitting either party to a contract to terminate the contract if the other
party were to file a bankruptcy petition or become insolvent); 11A Am Jur. Legal
Forms 2d § 161:830, at 254 (1998) (providing an example of a lease provision
permitting the lessor to repossess leased premises if the lessee were to file a
bankruptcy petition or become insolvent).
233. The insolvency conditions are generally stated as "the insolvency or financial
condition of the debtor,... the commencement of a case under this title, or ... the
appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a case under this title ... or a
custodian." See 11 U.S.C. 363 (1) (2000); see also id. § 363(b)(2), quoted supra note
216; id. § 365(e)(1); id. § 541(c)(1).
234. See, e.g., supra note 198 and accompanying text.
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Party retains during and after the bankruptcy case the benefit of its
prebankruptcy bargain with the debtor, through either performance
by a comparable substitute party or continued performance by a
reorganized debtor.
The Code properly invalidates "ipso-facto" provisions. Thus, an
"ipso-facto" provision may not prevent property from becoming
property of the estate 235 or prevent the trustee from using, selling, or
leasing property of the estate.2 36 Most significantly, an "ipso-facto"
provision may not effect a forfeiture, termination, or modification of
the debtor's interests in executory contracts or leases.237 Accordingly,
if S had agreed to sell 100 widgets to B for $20, and the market price
declines to $15 (resulting in a net loss to B of $5 for each widget), a
provision in the contract allowing B to terminate the contract if S files
for bankruptcy is invalid in bankruptcy. So long as the trustee
(including S as debtor in possession) provides adequate assurance of
due performance, the trustee can assume the contract and assign it to
another person.
The Non-Interference Principle applies to express and implied
"ipso-facto" provisions. Hence, federal courts in bankruptcy may
prevent Third Parties from using a discretionary power as a disguised
"ipso-facto" provision to terminate the debtor's contract or property
rights if in fact the sole reason for the action of the Third Party is the
debtor's filing of a bankruptcy petition.238

The Code's description

of the insolvency conditions in an

impermissible "ipso-facto" provision is broad; they go beyond the
commencement of a case under the Code to include the insolvency or
financial condition of the debtor. Going beyond the simple filing of a
petition is not constitutionally problematic. The overruling of these
"ipso-facto" clauses based on a broadly defined insolvency condition

occurs only in bankruptcy. If one party to a contract is not a debtor in
bankruptcy, the other party is free to exercise "ipso-facto" provisions
based on the debtor's financial condition.
235. See id. § 541(c)(l )(A) (providing that an interest of the debtor in property
becomes property of the estate notwithstanding an insolvency condition).
236. See id. § 363(1) (providing that the trustee may use, sell, or lease property of
the estate, or that a plan under chapter 11, 12, or 13 may provide for the use, sale, or
lease of property, notwithstanding an insolvency condition, quoted supra note 233,
"that effects, or gives an option to effect, a forfeiture, modification, or termination of
the debtor's interest in such property").
237. See id. § 365(e)(1) (providing that an executory contract or unexpired lease of
the debtor or rights under them may not be terminated or modified after the
commencement of the case solely because of an insolvency provision, quoted supra
note 233).
238. See, e.g., Holland America Ins. Co. v. Sportservice, Inc. (In re Cahokia Downs,
Inc.), 5 B.R. 529, 530, 532 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1980) (holding that insurance company
may not use its discretionary power to terminate insurance contract for any reason in
order to terminate debtor's insurance policy shortly after filing of bankruptcy petition
when only reason for termination was filing of petition).
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CONCLUSION: BANKRUPTCY POLICY AND THE BANKRUPTCY
CLAUSE

I do not seek to establish either an expansive or a restrictive
interpretation of the Bankruptcy Clause, simply a more precise
interpretation. In my view, Congress's power to enact laws "on the
subject of Bankruptcies" is limited to the adjustment of the
relationship between an insolvent debtor and his, her, or its creditors.
I have developed four principles that amplify this meaning. Three of
these principles directly govern the relationship between the federal
government under its Bankruptcy Power and the states and the extent
to which Congress may overrule state law: the Debtor-Creditor
Adjustment Principle, the Non-Expropriation Principle, and the NonInterference Principle.
Under the Debtor-Creditor Adjustment Principle, Congress may
by curtailing the
relationship
adjust the debtor-creditor
nonbankruptcy rights of a debtor for the benefit of the debtor's
creditors and by curtailing the nonbankruptcy rights of those creditors
against the debtor for the benefit of the debtor or other creditors.
Under the Non-Expropriation Principle, however, Congress may not
expand the rights of debtors or their creditors beyond that necessary
to adjust their relationship or otherwise diminish either (i) the rights
or privileges of parties outside of the debtor-creditor relationship for
the benefit of the debtor or the creditors or (ii) the nonbankruptcy
rights of the debtor or the creditors for the benefit of these Third
Finally, the Non-Interference Principle provides that
Parties.
Congress may prevent Third Parties from using nonbankruptcy law to
frustrate the bankruptcy process. Congress, in enacting or amending
the Code, and federal courts, in applying the Code, must comply with
these principles. For the most part, the Code does comply. In a few
instances, it does not.
My view of the constitutional scope of bankruptcy law raises the
practical difficulty of distinguishing between a creditor and a Third
Party, an essential distinction for applying the Debtor-Creditor
Adjustment Principle and the Non-Expropriation Principle. This
difficulty is exacerbated when the same entity wears two hats, such as
a landlord who is a "creditor" for past due rent and a Third Party
holder of a reversionary interest in the leasehold that may continue
after the commencement of the bankruptcy case. This duality also
regularly appears in the case of parties to executory contracts, at-will
employees, and governmental regulating and taxing entities, and also
may appear, to a lesser extent, in the case of joint holders of a
property interest.
Nevertheless, the practical difficulties should not overrule the
principles if they are sound. Under the Code today, bankruptcy
courts often must draw lines that are difficult. For example, courts
must and do draw a line between a prepetition claim, entitled to a
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speculative, pro-rata distribution, and a postpetition administrative
39
expense entitled to priority and more likely payment in full.
Moreover, if we do not draw the line between a creditor and a
Third Party, we must draw the line somewhere. One can only avoid
the necessity of drawing a line between bankruptcy law and
nonbankruptcy law if one believes that under the Constitution there
are no limits to bankruptcy law.24 Accordingly, regardless of the
appropriate limit on bankruptcy law under the Constitution, the
existence of a constitutional limitation on bankruptcy law requires
that Congress and federal courts in bankruptcy identify and
distinguish permissible bankruptcy law-in a constitutional sense, not
in a normative sense-and unalterable nonbankruptcy law.241
Those who believe that the normative role of bankruptcy is only to
maximize the return to creditors242 will want Congress to refrain from
altering the rights of creditors more than necessary to meet their
goals. This view of the normative limits on bankruptcy law fits well
within my view of the constitutional limits of bankruptcy as discussed
in this article. Those who espouse a broader view of bankruptcy
policy243 will want Congress to exercise its full power under the
239. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp v. DAK Indus. (In re DAK Indus.), 66 F.3d 1091,
1095 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that Microsoft's "royalty rate" owed by the debtor in
connection with the licensing and distribution by the debtor of Word for Windows
software was a prepetition claim and not an administrative expense).
240. See supra note 54.
241. In 1953, Alfred Hill remarked about the apparent lack of consensus on the
limits of bankruptcy law but posited that it must have some limits. See Hill, supra
note 110, at 1036-38.
242. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations
and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate
Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 97, 100-01 (1984);
Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on
Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 Va. L. Rev. 155, 155-56 (1989);
Robert E. Scott, Through Bankruptcy with the Creditors' Bargain Heuristic, 53 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 690, 692, 694-95 (1986) (reviewing Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson,
Cases, Problems & Materials on Bankruptcy (1985)).
243. See, e.g., Karen Gross, Failure and Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy
System (1997); Hon. Samuel L. Bufford, What Is Right About Bankruptcy Law and
Wrong About Its Critics, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 829, 838 (1994) (stating that "Chapter 11
protects vital businesses, protects jobs and communities, gives debtors an opportunity
to wait out an economic downturn, and avoids a catastrophic destruction of economic
values"); Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy and the Entitlements of the Government: Whose
Money Is It Anyway?, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 993, 1000, 1056-57 (1995) (arguing that, to
the extent that the federal bankruptcy system creates excess value over what creditors
could collect under state collection laws, the federal government could divert that
excess value from creditors to further any legitimate governmental interest);
Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775, 785-88 (1987) (arguing
that the goal of bankruptcy law should be to determine the best distribution of losses
from a debtor's failure among those affected by the insolvency of the debtor,
including the interests of many who are not technically "creditors" and not just the
maximization of the return to creditors); Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Case for
Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 Yale L.J. 437, 470, 478 (1992) (arguing the importance of
using bankruptcy reorganization to save jobs).
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Bankruptcy Clause in a manner consistent with their normative view
of bankruptcy. Those normative views may require that Congress
exceed what, in my opinion, are the constitutional limits on Congress's
Bankruptcy Power. If so, the sponsors of those views need to develop
their own theory on why the Bankruptcy Clause provides Congress
with the necessary power to implement their views.

Notes & Observations

